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ABSTRACT. Measures of risk attitudes derived from experiments are often questioned because they
are based on small stakes bets and do not account for the extent to which the decision-maker
integrates the prizes of the experimental tasks with personal wealth. We initially provide evidence
that risk attitudes over small stakes bets in Denmark are consistent with payoff calibration
paradoxes. We then exploit the existence of detailed information on individual wealth of
experimental subjects in Denmark, and directly estimate risk attitudes and the degree of asset
integration consistent with observed behavior. We hypothesize that the behavior of the Danes in our
experiment is consistent with partial asset integration. That is, we hypothesize that they behave as if
some fraction of personal wealth is combined with experimental prizes in a utility function, and that
wealth and experimental income are not perfectly substitutable. Our specification allows us to test
the special cases in which there is no asset integration at all or there is full asset integration. In
general, our subjects do not perfectly asset integrate. In the aggregate, the evidence favors zero asset
integration. When we examine the evidence at the individual level, the overall conclusion remains
the same for well over 80% of our sample, and none fully asset integrate. The implied risk attitudes
from estimating these specifications indicate risk premia and certainty equivalents that are a priori
plausible under expected utility theory or rank dependent utility models. This theory and evidence is
therefore one constructive solution to payoff calibration paradoxes. We identify some special cases
in which the partial asset integration approach fails to mitigate these calibration problems. In
addition, the rigorous, structural modeling of partial asset integration points to a rich array of
connections to the broader literature on risk preferences.
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Debate surrounding theories of decisions under risk and uncertainty has renewed interest in
the arguments of the utility function over event outcomes. The local measure of risk aversion
proposed by Arrow [1971] and Pratt [1964] for expected utility theory (EUT) is based on terminal
wealth being the argument. However, there is nothing in the axiomatic foundation of EUT that
requires one to use terminal wealth as the argument: Vickrey [1945] used income instead of terminal
wealth; von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944; p. 15-20][1953; p. 15-31] were agnostic; and Luce and
Raiffa [1957; ch.2] discussed alternatives such as scalar amounts of terminal wealth or income or,
alternatively, vectors of commodities. Arrow [1964], Debreu [1959; ch.7] and Hirshleifer [1965][1966]
developed models in which the arguments of utility functions are vectors of contingent commodities.
The choice of arguments of the utility function can have significant consequences for the
inferences one can plausibly draw from empirical estimates of risk attitudes. Many economics
experiments present participants with gambles over relatively small stakes and find that such gambles
are frequently turned down in favor of less risky gambles with smaller expected values: modest risk
aversion is the general finding. If the argument of the utility function is terminal wealth, then some
specific patterns of small stakes risk aversion have implausible implications for preferences over
gambles where the stakes are no longer small. One example from Rabin [2000] is that the expected
utility of terminal wealth model implies that an agent who turns down a 50/50 bet of losing $100 or
gaining $110, at all initial wealth levels between $100 and $300,000, will also turn down a 50/50 bet
with possible loss of $2,000 even when the gain is as large as $12 million if they have an initial wealth
of $290,000. However, if the argument of the utility function is not terminal wealth, but rather the
stakes offered in the gamble itself, or some other non-additive aggregation of initial wealth and the
stakes, implications of this assumed pattern of small stakes risk aversion are no longer ridiculous
(implausible) risk aversion (Cox and Sadiraj [2006]). 
Given the importance of understanding the arguments of the utility function, the absence of
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empirical tests is remarkable. We initially provide evidence that risk attitudes over small stakes bets in
Denmark are indeed consistent with payoff calibration paradoxes. We then present evidence from a
unique data source that allows us to confront the question of whether integration of wealth with
income in risk preferences is full, partial or null, when agents are making choices over gambles with
more modest stakes. We combine field experimental data on lottery choices from a sample of the
Danish population and individual-level information on “personal wealth” from a confidential database
maintained by Statistics Denmark. Using these data we are able to identify a measure of personal wealth for
the very same individuals that participated in standard experimental tasks. This allows us to explore theoretical
specifications that measure the extent to which individuals integrate their wealth with the prizes on
offer in the experimental lottery tasks.
We find no support for the terminal wealth model. We initially consider the evidence pooling
over all subjects, assuming homogeneous preferences. Our subjects behave as if they integrate only a
tiny fraction of their personal wealth with the lottery prizes they are asked to make choices over. In
effect, this “weighted wealth” is indistinguishable statistically and economically from zero. We also
consider the evidence for each subject individually, allowing each subject to have different risk
preferences and different levels of asset integration. We find that 77% of our subjects behave as if they
have a weighted baseline wealth of less than 10 kroner when evaluating risky lotteries, and 83% behave
as if they have a weighted baseline wealth less than 1,000 kroner. None behave as if they fully asset
integrate.
In section 1 we briefly review the theoretical literature on the arguments of utility over vectors
of outcomes and implications for the measurement of risk attitudes. We note that calibration issues
apply to a wide range of decision models (Neilson [2001], Safra and Segal [2008], Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt
and Dasgupta [2013] and Sadiraj [2014]). Moreover, extreme assumptions about the nature of asset
integration can be seen as special cases of a more flexible specification that admits both wealth and
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experimental income as arguments of some non-linear function. These results are not new, but they
are not widely known. They are important because they serve up a menu of theoretically coherent
alternatives to the extreme, “all or nothing” assumptions about asset integration that are often
subsumed in the literature.
In section 2 we describe the data we have assembled from a combination of experimental tasks
and links to Danish Registry databases maintained by Statistics Denmark (SD). The sense in which our
measure of “personal wealth” deserves quotation marks is explained. It does not include everything
that a theorist might want to see in there, such as the present subjective value of human capital, nor
does it include every category of financial wealth. On the other hand, it is arguably the most
comprehensive wealth measure available to those who are interested in testing the theories of decision
under risk.
In section 3 we present the structural model and econometric assumptions used to evaluate the
extent of asset integration inferred from our data, and implications for risk attitudes. Section 4
presents estimates and implications. Section 5 outlines some connections to the literature, and issues
that arise in the general case in which experimental choices and non-experimental choices are
evaluated jointly. Section 6 draws conclusions.
We make two contributions. The first is to develop a general framework that clarifies that the
core issue in the payoff calibration debate is the extent to which preferences are over income or final
wealth, and embeds the two extremes that have characterized the debate as special cases. The second
contribution is to use this framework to estimate the extent to which risk attitudes to income variation
in the lab are integrated with wealth using two sources of wealth variation. One source is a within-
subject manipulation of variations in wealth, and demonstrates that perfect asset integration would
indeed be consistent with payoff calibration puzzles for our sample. The second source is cross-
sectional variation of wealth in the Danish population, under the assumption of homogeneous
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preferences, and implies very little asset integration. The first source of wealth variation establishes the
need for examination of the second source of wealth variation.
1. Theory
A. Calibration Critiques
Some seemingly plausible patterns of small-stakes risk aversion can be shown, through
concavity calibration arguments, to have implausible implications for large stakes gambles under the
terminal wealth specification, where initial wealth and income are integrated perfectly.1 Alternative
empirical identifications of small-stakes patterns have implausible large-stakes implications for models
defined on income, in which there is no integration of wealth with income.2 A different type of
(convexity) calibration analysis applies to models with nonlinear probability transformations.3  From
this literature, the theories that are now known to be subject to calibration critique include expected
utility theory, the dual theory of expected utility (Yaari [1987]), rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin
[1982]), cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman [1992]), and weighted utility and
betweenness theories (Chew [1983] and Dekel [1986]). 
There are two types of calibration critiques that one needs to be cognizant of: we refer to these
as “payoff calibration” critiques and “probability calibration” critiques. We consider the implications
of the payoff calibration critiques. Within that category of critiques, the same risky (low-stakes) lottery
choices can have quite different implications depending on the extent to which wealth is integrated
with income in risk preferences. This is our principal focus, once we consider the empirical validity of
the “seemingly plausible patterns of risk aversion” that underpin the calibration critique.
1 See Hansson [1988], Rabin [2000], Neilson [2001] and Safra and Segal [2008] for concavity
calibrations of terminal wealth models.
2 See Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Rieger and Wang [2006] for payoff calibrations of income models.
3 See Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt and Dasgupta [2013] and Sadiraj [2014] for probability calibrations of models
with nonlinear probability transformations. 
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B. Small Stakes Risk Aversion
The payoff calibration critique may be stated in terms of four suppositions:
• P Ö “the agent is a risk averse EUT maximizer”
• Q Ö “the agent fully asset integrates”
• R Ö “the agent (weakly) turns down small-stakes gambles in favor of a certain amount with a
slightly lower expected value, and does so over a large enough4 range of wealth levels W”
• S Ö “the agent turns down large-stakes gambles in favor of a certain amount with a
significantly lower value, and looks silly.”
The calibration puzzle is the claim that if P, Q and R are true, then S follows. Since the behavior
implied by supposition S is a priori implausible from a thought experiment, something must be
inconsistent with these suppositions. Rabin [2000] and Rabin and Thaler [2001] draw the implication
that P must then be false, and that one should employ models of decision-making under risk that relax
supposition Q, such as Cumulative Prospect Theory. As a purely logical matter, of course, this is just
one way of many ways to resolve this calibration puzzle.
All of the evidence claimed to support the premise in statement R that decision makers in
experiments exhibit small stakes risk aversion for a large enough finite interval of wealth levels comes
from designs in which subjects come to the lab with potentially varying levels of wealth and are faced
with small-stakes lotteries. This is actually indirect evidence, even if it might be suggestive, since we do
not know that different decision-makers have significantly varying levels of wealth, and there is nothing
in EUT that would lead one to assume that they have the same utility function.5 In other words, this
between-subjects evidence is only valid as a test of supposition R if we assume homogeneity of risk
preferences and FAI.6 What is needed to evaluate supposition R is an experimental design that varies
4 The expression “large enough” is deliberately vague, since it depends on the degree of risk aversion
exhibited under supposition R, and the lotteries in statement S that a priori seem silly behavior.
5 Indeed, we will show later that it is plausible that a small fraction of the Danish population has
essentially zero net financial wealth, making the payoff calibration critique moot. It is a priori plausible that this
fraction might be much larger for the typical subjects of laboratory experiments, university students.
6 Indeed, a common alternative assumption in the experimental literature is to assume NAI and
interpret variation across wealth and observed choices across subjects as heterogeneity of risk preferences. It
is apparent that both interpretations rest on previously untested, and extreme, assumptions about the degree
of asset integration (FAI or NAI, respectively).
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the wealth of a given decision-maker, who can be presumed to behave consistently with one utility
function during the lab session. Cox and Sadiraj [2008] propose a simple experimental design that does
just this.
Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p.33] propose that one give the agent a choice between a safe lottery of
w for sure, and a risky lottery of a 50:50 chance of w-x or w+y, where w-x $ 0 and y > x. The key idea
is to vary w in the lab. Consider values of w from the ordered set, S = {w, w, w, w, w, w, w}, where
smaller values of the letter w denote smaller values of lab wealth. These values of lab wealth may be
plausibly much less than the W that the subject has in the field prior to the experiment. The
experimenter does not need to know W for a given subject, but by varying “lab wealth” from S for
that subject the experimenter has considered small-stakes lottery choices over 50-50 probabilities of a
low prize of w-x and a high prize of w+y against “lab wealth” w for sure, or “field + lab” wealth levels
W+w, with w from S, for that subject. This step of the design presumes that we vary lab wealth for a
given subject, since then we can plausibly presume that field wealth W is constant for the experimental
session. And this step of the experimental design also assumes supposition Q, that the agent perfectly
asset integrates field wealth and lab wealth.
If the agent prefers the safe lottery over the risky lottery for all of the lab wealth values the
experimenter’s budget can afford, then we have verification of supposition R, at least for the range of
“field + lab” wealth proscribed by the experimenter’s budget. If we observe the agent choosing the
safe lottery for small levels of lab wealth but the risky lottery for larger levels of lab wealth, then
supposition R is rejected for that agent. Of course, we do not expect deterministic patterns of choice,
so one ought to make some claim about the statistical significance of these choice patterns. This is one
of the reasons for having multiple choices for each subject. An attractive feature of this experimental
design is that we need not structurally model the EUT decision process for the agent: we can rely on
simple statistical models such as (panel) probit, conditioned on lab wealth.
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Building on this design, there have been “lab” tests of the premises of the calibration claims by
Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt and Dasgupta [2013], Harrison [2015], Harrison, Lau, Ross and Swarthout [2017]
and Wilcox [2013].
C. Partial Asset Integration within EUT
If supposition R cannot be rejected for the population under study, we must consider the
implications of the payoff calibration critique in a constructive manner, and for that we turn to the
idea of partial asset integration of wealth and income. We develop our analysis for a class of expected
utility models that includes as special cases models with full asset integration (FAI), models with no
asset integration (NAI), and models with partial asset integration (PAI). Models with full asset
integration are possibly subject to the payoff calibration critique of Hansson [1988] and Rabin [2000].
Models with no asset integration or partial asset integration are possibly subject to the payoff
calibration critique of Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Rieger and Wang [2006], depending on specific
functional forms and parameter estimates. Rather than engage in a priori arguments or thought
experiments about paradoxes of risky choice, we develop a general theoretical model and let real data
do some “real talking” in combination with that theoretical structure.
Cox and Sadiraj [2006] discuss the expected utility of initial wealth and income model with
utility functional
I u(w, y) dG = EG (u(w, y)), (1)
where G is an integrable probability distribution function and u is a utility function of initial wealth w
and income y. We refer to this as the PAI-EUT model. Two standard models included in the PAI-
EUT model are the expected utility of terminal wealth model with full asset integration (FAI-EUT),
for which u(w, y) = ν(w+y), and the expected utility of income model with no asset integration (NAI-
EUT), for which u(w, y) = ξ(y).7 These two standard models are polar cases in the class of models of
7 Any utility function of the form u(w,y) = ξ(y) + h(w) would exhibit the same risk preferences over
income y, as does ξ(y). This approach shares the Cumulative Prospect Theory shortcoming: both approaches
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PAI.
Formally, G in (1) is a joint distribution over w and y. In our application, we treat w as
deterministic and known, and of course y is stochastic by experimental design. This is consistent with
the usual way in which asset integration is discussed in the literature. We discuss this issue further in
section 5.
We begin with a quasiconcave utility function u(w, y) defined over money payoff in the lab, y,
and a measure of wealth, w. In a typical experiment subjects’ payoffs are paid in amounts of cash that
may not be a perfect substitute for outside the laboratory wealth because of differences in liquidity and
transaction costs. For example, $100 in housing equity is not a perfect substitute for $100 in cash
received from participation in an experiment. Therefore, we consider the possibility that money
payoffs in an experiment and wealth outside the laboratory may not be perfect substitutes.8 There is
then a need to distinguish curvature of indifference curves due to preferences over (w, y) from the
preferences over risk.
do not allow switching from pattern R to not-R across wealth levels. In addition, with these specifications,
just as with Cumulative Prospect Theory, knowledge about ξ which comes from lab data is not informative
about h(w) unless one assumes that h and ξ are the same up to positive affine transformations. 
8 It is the case that if w and y are allowed to be imperfect substitutes then we have to assume the
possibility of imperfect markets in w and y, or else some elementary no-arbitrage conditions would be
violated. We do not view this as particularly problematic, for three reasons. First, if behavior is better
characterized by assuming that w and y are indeed imperfect substitutes, then we have to assume imperfect
markets. But then that assumption is one that is in effect supported by the data, even if it runs counter to
some stylized model of behavior. That is, imagine that w and y are imperfect substitutes in preferences, but
perfect substitutes at some relative price in the market. Then we would never observe behavior suggesting
that they are perfect substitutes, hence we would never observe full asset integration behavior. The second
reason that we do not view the assumption of imperfect markets as problematic is that there are transactions
costs in converting one asset to another, at least for the assets we consider. These transactions costs might be
larger or smaller for different individuals, or for different asset classes when one considers generalizations (as
we do in §5), but those have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The third reason is related to the second:
we could imagine an even more general model in which the degree of asset integration emerges endogenously
as a function of circumstances: these could be the transactions costs faced in substituting assets in the market,
but it could also be the cognitive burden of thinking of the assets as perfect substitutes in preferences. That is,
for some unstated reason the agent might prefer to keep w and y in distinct “mental accounts,” but still think
of them as substitutable to some degree.
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D. Parametric Structure
A Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function can be used to aggregate wealth w and
money payoff m when there is no risk. The terminal wealth model is found at one extreme of
parameter values and the pure income model at the other. But the real interest is in between these
extremes, and the point is to let the behavior of our subjects tell us the extent to which they (behave as
if they) are integrating wealth with income from the experiment in making their choices. 
Assume that all agents have the same ordinal preferences (when there is no risk), but can differ
in their cardinal preferences (over risky outcomes).9 We begin with studying homothetic preferences.
Following Debreu [1976; p.122], there exists a least concave function, u*, which is a cardinal utility
that represents the same ordinal preferences. In case of homothetic preferences, the least concave
function is a homogenous function of degree one. So we use the CES specification 
v(w, y) = [ω w ρ + y ρ ] 1/ρ (2)
where w $ 0  is a measure of individual wealth, y $ 0 is the prize in the money payoff in the
experimental task, ω is a distributive share parameter to be estimated, σ = 1/(1-ρ) is the revealed
“elasticity of substitution” between wealth and experimental money payoff, and is also to be estimated,
and !4 < ρ#1 to ensure that v(.) is quasiconcave. Risk averse preferences over (w, y) are represented
by concave transformations of this function, and the EUT assumption that objective probabilities are
not modified to generate decision weights. An often used specification of such transformation is the
power function
U(v) = v1-r/(1-r) (3)
where r…1 and v is defined by (2). In effect, (2) and (3) define a two-level, nested utility function,
where (2) is an “aggregator function” defining a composite good, and (3) is the utility function defined
9 In a uni-variate model with either income or wealth as the only argument, cardinality is modeled
entirely through the concavity of the utility function over the single argument. Here, however, cardinality
depends also on the convexity of the contour functions over the two imperfectly substitutable utility
arguments.
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directly over that composite.10 Thus we can rewrite (3) more compactly as
U(w, y) = [(ω w ρ + y ρ ) (1-r)/ρ ]/(1-r) (3N)
where ω w ρ + y ρ > 0.11 This generalized CES function blends together full, partial, and null asset
integration on (w, y) space with risk preferences on composite good, v(w, y), space.
With these parametric assumptions, the familiar one-dimensional Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk aversion with respect to y, evaluated at w, is then
[ r yρ -  wρ (ρ-1) ω ] / [ yρ + wρ ω ] (4)
We discuss the need for measures of multivariate risk aversion in section 5 if one is to generalize our
approach to allow both arguments of the utility function to be random.
Perfect asset integration with the “utility of terminal wealth” EUT model is the special case in
which ω > 0 and σ = 4. The usual case in the literature assumes further that ω=1 and σ = 4, so that
income and wealth are added together on a 1:1 basis. Zero asset integration with the “utility of
income” EUT model, where income is interpreted tightly to mean the income from this specific
experimental choice,12 is the special case in which ω = 0.13  Note that we say nothing in this case about
10 This power function is unbounded, so it is useful to be clear on the implications for concavity
calibration puzzles under FAI and EUT on a bounded or unbounded domain. If the utility function is
bounded on (0, 4) then that is a sufficient condition for implausible risk aversion in large stakes (e.g., Cox and
Sadiraj [2008; Proposition 2, p.20]); global small-stakes risk aversion is not needed for this result. It is not a
necessary condition. Small-stakes risk aversion over all (0, 4) is a sufficient condition for the utility function to
be bounded (e.g., Rabin [2000; p.1283] or Cox and Sadiraj [2006; p.59, §C.4]); it is not, however, a necessary
condition. Being bounded on (0, 4) is a necessary condition for small-stakes risk aversion over the open
interval (0, 4), but it is not sufficient. An increasing power function is unbounded and hence violates the
necessary condition on boundedness; therefore it cannot represent risk attitudes that exhibit small-stakes risk
aversion over all (0, 4). The sufficiency part can be illustrated by considering a CARA function with
parameter 0.0003; it is bounded, however the small-stakes risk aversion pattern is not satisfied, since $100 for
sure is rejected in favor of an equal chance of $210 or $0. Small-stakes risk aversion defined on a finite interval
implies nothing at all about the boundedness of the utility function. Finally, small-stakes risk aversion over a
large enough finite interval is a sufficient condition for implausible risk aversion for large stakes, whether or not
the utility function is bounded or unbounded.
11 For negative prizes in income, write it as:  ω w ρ + sign(y) abs(y) ρ > 0.
12 This interpretation is “tight” in the sense that one might also consider income from the set of
experimental tasks that this binary choice is embedded in, or the income from the whole experimental session.
For example, is income the lottery prize in one binary choice pair, the income from the 60 choices, or the
income from the whole session since there were additional paid choices in addition to these lottery choice
questions? One could undertake an exactly parallel discussion of partial asset integration within the
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σ, because any value of σ would generate the same observed choices if ω=0. Our main hypothesis is
that subjects perfectly asset integrate with their actual wealth.14
2. Data
Our data consist of observations of choice behavior in experimental tasks and wealth data for
442 individuals. The sample is representative of the adult Danish population residing in Greater
Copenhagen as of January 2015. Our sample consists of 52% men, aged 47 on average, 43% of whom
were married, with an average household size of 1.4, and with average income of 434,085 kroner per
year. Comparing to the 1,455,772 comparable Danes in the Registry, our subjects are not statistically
significantly different except for household size and income: the population averages were 1.54 and
338,859 kroner, respectively. These are not economically significant differences. 
All experiments were run in February and March, 2015. The experimental data are of the
standard type, and employ procedures described in detail in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström
[2014]. 
The wealth data are novel, and involve matching the experimental subjects with data collected
by SD. The matching process, and all statistical analyses with those data, occur “remotely” at the
statistical agency, to ensure privacy. However, they may be replicated under conditions described
below.
A. Experimental Data
Each of our 442 subjects was asked to make choices for each of 60 pairs of lotteries in the gain
experimental session, evaluating what might be called “local asset integration” issues. Our focus here is on
“global asset integration issues” between the usual interpretations of experimental data and the implications of
the calibration critiques.
13 And, to visualize these intuitively as perfectly complementary Leontief preferences, one might
further assume σ = 0. This assumption, although implicit in some discussions, is not necessary for NAI. 
14 An alternative approach to allowing for partial asset integration, adopted by Harrison, List and
Towe [2007] and Heinemann [2008], is to assume σ = 4 and estimate the composite Ω such that v = Ω+y is
employed by the decision-maker using a utility function such as (3). This approach is useful, as far as it goes,
to move away from the pure “utility of income” EUT model. However, it does not address the manner in
which experimental prizes are integrated with wealth, which is the focus of our analysis.
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domain, designed to provide evidence of risk aversion as well as the tendency to make decisions
consistently with EUT or RDU models.15 Appendix A lists these lottery parameters. In general each
lottery has 3 prizes, although there are some lotteries with 4 prizes, 2 prizes or just 1 prize. The battery
is based on ingenious designs from Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994], Loomes and Sugden [1998] and
Wilcox [2015], as well as the direct test of Supposition R proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p.33]
reviewed earlier. The analysis of risk attitudes given these choices follows Harrison, Lau and Rutström
[2007] and Harrison and Rutström [2008].
Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994] constructed lotteries to carefully test the “comonotonic
independence” axiom of RDU. Their main lottery pairs consist of 6 sets of 4 pairs. The logic of their
design can be understood by considering the first set, from Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994; Figure
3.1]. The second and third prizes in each pair stay the same within the set of 4 choice pairs. The only
thing that varies from pair to pair is the monetary value of the first prize, and that is common to the
“safe” and “risky” lottery within each pair. Since the first listed prize is a common consequence in
both lotteries within a pair, it should not affect choices under EUT. In the 1st pair the first prize is only
$0.50, and is the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries. The first prize increases to $3.50 for the 2nd
pair, and is again the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries: so rank-dependence should have no effect
on choice patterns as the subject moves from the 1st to the 2nd pair. But when we come to the 3rd pair
the first prize is $6.50, which makes it the second highest ranked prize for both lotteries; this is where
RDU could have a different prediction than EUT, depending on the extent and nature of probability
weighting. Finally, in the 4th pair the common consequence is the highest ranked prize for both
lotteries, again allowing RDU to predict something different from EUT (and from the choices in the 3rd
15 The subjects were also presented with other decision tasks in the experiment, which are not
analyzed here. For each type of decision task the subjects had a 10% chance of getting paid. If they were paid
in the part of the experiment analyzed, one of the 60 decision tasks was randomly selected and the chosen
lottery was played out for payment. Average earnings for those who got paid from these 60 decision tasks was
1,923 DKK. Average earnings  including recruitment fees across all 442 subjects was 954 DKK. 
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pair). Note that this design does not formally require an RDU decision-maker to choose differently
than an EUT decision-maker; it simply encourages it for a priori reasonable levels of probability
weighting. We employ all 24 of their main lottery pairs, and scale the prizes up considerably.
Loomes and Sugden [1998] pose an important design feature for common ratio tests: variation
in the “gradient” of the EUT-consistent indifference curves within a Marschak-Machina (MM)
triangle. The reason is to generate some choice patterns that are more powerful tests of EUT for any
given risk attitude. Under EUT the slope of the indifference curve within a MM triangle is a measure
of risk aversion. So there always exists some risk attitude such that the subject is indifferent, and
evidence of common ratio violations has virtually zero power; their logic avoids this problem. We use
30 lottery pairs from their design, with slightly different prizes.
Wilcox [2015] designed lottery tasks for the purpose of robust estimation of EUT and RDU
models at the level of the individual. These lottery pairs span five monetary prize amounts, 300, 600,
1200, 2100 and 4200 kroner, and five probabilities, 0, ¼, ½, ¾ and 1. The prizes are combined in ten
“contexts,” defined as a particular triple of prizes.16 These lotteries also contain a number of pairs in
which the “EUT-safe” lottery has a higher  EV than the “EUT-risky” lottery: this is designed
deliberately to evaluate the extent of risk premia deriving from probability pessimism rather than
diminishing marginal utility. Wilcox [2010] documents a wide variety of probability weighting
functions from choices from his complete battery, based on estimates at the individual level. We use
36 lottery pairs from his wider battery.
A final battery of 6 lottery pairs is designed to test the premise  of the calibration puzzle posed
by Hansson [1988] and Rabin [2000], using the logic proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p.33] and
discussed earlier. Our specific parameters are adapted from those employed by Wilcox [2013].
16 For example, the first context consists of lotteries defined over the prizes $5, $10 and $20, and the
tenth context consists of lotteries defined over the prizes $20, $35 and $70. The significance of the prize
context is explained by Wilcox [2010][2011].
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 The full list of lottery pairs is listed in an appendix. There were 4 batteries used across the 442
subjects. Each battery included the 24 lottery pairs from Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994]. One battery
also included 36 lottery pairs from Wilcox [2015], and this full set of 60 lottery pairs was administered
to 222 subjects. The remaining three batteries included the lotteries inspired by Loomes and Sugden
[1998] and Cox and Sadiraj [2008], for another set of 60 lottery pairs administered to 220 subjects; the
three versions of this battery differed by varying the scale of payoffs, as shown in Appendix A. 
We carefully selected these lotteries to ensure considerable variation in prizes and probabilities,
to facilitate identification of the full structural model. Over all batteries there are 90 distinct prizes and
16 distinct probabilities, with their distribution shown in Appendix A. At the individual subject level
the number of distinct prizes is either 37 or 26, and the number of distinct probabilities is either 16 or
12.
Apart from the tests of supposition R, these choices themselves are not the direct basis for our
evaluation of the payoff calibration paradoxes. Combined with the wealth data for each subject, these
choices allow us to estimate the risk preferences implied by EUT and RDU models, and those estimates
are then used to evaluate the paradoxes with counterfactual lottery choices. The many variations in
wealth, lottery payoffs and lottery probabilities implied by our design allows us to identify all the
required theory parameters.
B. Wealth Data
Wealth data are based on register data from SD. Our data contain economic, financial, and
personal information on each individual from relevant official registers. The data set was constructed
based on two sources made available from SD and matched with our experimental data: these sources
are the Danish Civil Registration Office and the Danish Tax Authorities. All permanent residents in
Denmark, and all Danish citizens, have a unique social security number given at birth or the date of
formal residence, known as the CPR number, and this number allows us to match data across data
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sources. The CPR number follows every individual throughout the entire life and all information on
an individual is registered on this number. We had access to the CPR number of every subject in our
experiments.
Individual and family data are taken from the records in the Danish Civil Registration. These
data contain the entire Danish population and provide unique identification across individuals and
households over time. Each record includes the personal identification number (CPR), name, gender,
date of birth, as well as the CPR numbers of nuclear family members (parents, siblings, and children)
and marital history (number of marriages, divorces, and widowhoods). In addition to providing extra
control variables, such as age, gender, and marital status, these data enable us to identify the subjects
that participated in the artefactual field experiment described above, as well as creating additional
household characteristics.
Income and wealth information are retrieved from the official tax records at the Danish Tax
Authorities (SKAT). This data set contains personal income and wealth information by CPR numbers
on the entire Danish population. SKAT receives this information directly from the relevant sources:
financial institutions supply information to SKAT on their customers’ deposits, on financial market
assets, on interest paid or received, and on security investments and dividends. Employers similarly
supply statements of wages paid to their employees.
The wealth variable in our analysis is constructed from data reported by SD that represent net
individual wealth.17 Total assets are the market value of domestic real estate, shares and mutual funds,
bonds, assets deposited in domestic and foreign financial institutions, pensions and the value of
automobiles. Total liabilities are the value of debt in domestic and foreign financial institutions and
mortgages. All values of shares, bonds and pensions are reported by financial institutions as of
17 An alternative is to use household wealth rather than individual wealth, exploiting further the
ability of our data to identify other members of the household of the subject in our experiments. On the other
hand, one then opens up subtle issues about whose risk attitudes were on display in the experiments (i.e.,
those of the individual, or those of the household) and how households pool income from individuals.
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December 31, 2014; values of real estate are estimated by SD as the market value on December 31,
2014; and the value of automobiles is calculated by SD with a one-year lag.18 All values are in 2015
Danish kroner, and values are reported for the full sample of 442 subjects (conversions to USD use
the exchange rate 1 DKK . 6.643 USD applicable during most of the experiments).
Our wealth measure does not include cash, value of yachts, paintings, equity in privately held
companies, nor the market value of shareholder equity in privately held companies and unlisted mutual
funds. Our wealth measure does include shareholder equity in publically traded companies and listed
mutual funds. The wealth measure does not include non-traded assets such as human capital, which
means that borrowing for assets such as education is seen as debt without any corresponding assets.
This is arguably one of the most comprehensive measures of private financial wealth for an entire
population that one can get, although we realize that some important non-financial components are
left out.
Table 1 provides a tabulation of wealth and its components for our sample, and Figure 1
displays the distribution. For 4.7% of our subjects, or 21 out of 442, there is negative net wealth,
reflecting the fact that some assets are not fully accounted for. For all calculations we assume that
wealth cannot be negative and truncate it to zero. Individuals with zero wealth cannot, by definition,
asset integrate: in a formal sense, of course, they do integrate, but the effect is as if they do not since
they have zero wealth.
Access to these unique data is an important issue, both in terms of the ability of others to
replicate our findings and for their ability to extend our analysis. Researchers at authorized Danish
institutions can gain access to de-identified micro data provided by SD through remote access
connections. SD manages most of Danish micro data. The fundamental authorization principle of SD
is that data will not be disclosed where there is an imminent risk that an individual person or individual
18 All foreign assets and debt are self-reported to SKAT, and are zero for every subject in our sample. 
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enterprise can be identified. This applies not only to identified data, such as CPR numbers, but also to
de-identified data, since such data are usually so detailed that identification can be made.19
3. Econometric Model
A. Expected Utility Theory
Although the concerns about implausible risk attitudes under terminal wealth specifications
apply to all decision theories that are additive over states, we initially focus on EUT because it is
parsimonious. Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome yj, p(yj), are those that are induced by
the experimenter, so expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each
lottery i 0 {A, B}, where A and B denote left and right lottery, respectively. Using U(w, y) from (3N),
we then have:
EUi =3 j=1, J [ (p(y j )) × U(w, y j ) ] = 3 j=1, J [ p j × U(w, y j ) ] (6)
for a lottery with J prizes. To capture behavioral errors we employ a Fechner specification with
“contextual utility,” so that we assume the latent index
LEU = [(EUB ! EUA)/τ]/μ (7)
where τ is a normalizing term described in a moment, μ is the Fechner behavioral error parameter to
be estimated, and EUB and EUA are the expected utilities of the right and left lottery as presented to
subjects. The normalizing term τ is defined as the difference between the maximum utility over all of
the prizes in that lottery pair minus the minimum utility over all of the prizes in that lottery pair. Thus
it varies from choice context to choice context, depends on the parameters of the utility function, and
19 Access to Danish micro data follows the Act on Processing of Personal Data (in Danish, the Lov
om Behandling af Personoplysninger). This requires a notification to the Danish Data Protection Agency
whenever data are made available to researchers. Access can only be granted to researchers in authorised
environments. Authorizations can be granted to public research and analysts environments (e.g., in
universities, sector research institutes and ministries) and to research organizations as a part of a charitable
organization. Certain groups in the private sector can get authorization. Only Danish institutions are granted
authorization. Foreign researchers can have access to Danish micro data if they are affiliated with an
appropriate Danish Institution. Visiting researchers can have remote access from a workplace in the Danish
research institution during their stay in Denmark, and under the Danish authorization.
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normalizes the difference in EU to lie between 0 and 1. This results in a more theoretically coherent
concept of risk aversion when one allows for a behavioral error such as with μ (Wilcox [2011]).
The latent index (7), based on latent preferences, is then linked to the observed experimental
choices using a standard cumulative normal distribution function Φ(LEU). This “probit” function
takes any argument between ±4 and transforms it into a number between 0 and 1 using this familiar
function. Thus we have the probit link function,
prob(choose lottery B) = Φ(LEU) (8)
The index defined by (7) is linked to the observed choices by assuming that the probability that the B
lottery is chosen depends on LEU in the manner specified by (8).
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and utility
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of the utility function given the above statistical
specification and the observed choices. The log-likelihood for the utility function (3N) is
ln L(r, ω, ρ, μ; c, w) = 3i [ (ln Φ(LEU)×I(ci = 1)) + (ln Φ(1!LEU)×I(ci = !1)) ] (9)
where I(@) is the indicator function, ci =1(!1) denotes the choice of the Option B (A) lottery in risk
aversion task i, and LEU is defined using the parameters r, ω, ρ and μ.20 All estimates employ
clustering at the level of the individual, since errors for a given individual may be correlated.
B. Rank Dependent Utility Theory
One popular alternative to EUT is to allow the decision-maker to transform the objective
probabilities presented in lotteries and to use these weighted probabilities as decision weights when
20 One of the core hypotheses to be tested is that ω = 0, and one can run into issues with such
hypothesis tests where the parameter in question is close to the boundary of an admissible region. In fact, we
are estimating a likelihood function that is already highly non-linear in the parameters (e.g., the curvature of
the utility function). Hence we can use a standard numerical method to constrain parameters such as ω to lie
in the unit interval by estimating a different parameter o which is then, in the function evaluator, converted
to ω = 1/(1+exp(o)).  In this manner, as explained in Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014; p.
225], the algorithm evaluating the likelihood can vary o between ±4 and still keep ω constrained to the unit
interval. All hypothesis tests defined over ω are numerically undertaken on the estimated parameter o, which
by definition never gets close to a boundary (the hypothesis tests are therefore non-linear in nature, and use
the “delta method” to correctly infer test statistics and p-values).
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evaluating lotteries. To calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces expected utility defined by
(6) with RDU
RDUi = 3 j=1,J [ (d(y j )) × U(w, y j ) ] = 3 j=1,J [ d j × U(w, y j ) ] (10)
where
dj = π(pj + ... + pJ) - π(pj+1 + ... + pJ) (11a)
for j=1,... , J-1, and
dj = π(pj) (11b)
for j=J, with the subscript j ranking outcomes from worst to best, π(@) is some probability weighting
function, dj is the decision weight on the jth-ranked outcome, and RDU refers to the Rank-Dependent
Utility model of Quiggin [1982]. Of course, one then has to specify the functional form for π(p) and
estimate additional parameters, but the logic extends naturally.
We use the general functional form proposed by Prelec [1998] for probability, since it exhibits
considerable flexibility.21 This function is
π(p) = exp{-η(-ln p)φ}, (12)
and is defined for 0<p#1, η>0 and φ>0. When φ=1 this function collapses to the familiar Power
function π(p) = pη. Of course, EUT assumes the identity function π(p)=p, which is the case when η =
φ = 1. With (12) included, the log-likelihood then becomes
ln L(r, ω, ρ, η, φ, μ; c, w) = 3i [ (ln Φ(LRDU)×I(ci = 1)) + (ln Φ(1!LRDU)×I(ci = !1)) ] (13)
and we estimate the model with two extra parameters for the probability weighting function.22
Estimating the RDU model from experiments that employ the Random Lottery Incentive
21 Many apply the Prelec [1998; Proposition 1, part (B)] function with constraint 0 < φ < 1, which
requires that the probability weighting function exhibit subproportionality (so-called “inverse-S” weighting).
Contrary to received wisdom, many individuals exhibit estimated probability weighting functions that violate
subproportionality, so we use the more general specification from Prelec [1998; Proposition 1, part (C)], only
requiring φ > 0, and let the evidence determine if the estimated φ lies in the unit interval. This seemingly
minor point often makes a major difference empirically. One also often finds applications of the one-
parameter Prelec [1988] function, on the grounds that it is “flexible” and only uses one parameter. The
additional flexibility over the Inverse-S probability weighting function is real, but minimal compared to the
full two-parameter function.
22 The context will make it clear whether estimates of r, ω, ρ and μ refer to the EUT model or the
RDU model.
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Method (RLIM) requires that one assumes that individuals isolate each pairwise lottery choice within
the series from each other. This implies the compound independence axiom, even though the RDU
model allows independence to be violated when subjects evaluate each simple lottery. The vast
majority of incentivized lottery choice experiments use RLIM and rely on this axiom. Thus, the RDU
model applied to RLIM data inconsistently relaxes that axiom when it comes to evaluating individual
lotteries, but assumes that it is valid when applying the RLIM payment protocol (Harrison and
Swarthout [2014] and Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt [2015]).
4. Results and Implications
A. Tests of the Small Stakes Risk Aversion Premis
Using the test proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008] for a sub-sample of 220 adult Danes from
our complete sample of 442, we actually find evidence of the relevant type of “small stakes risk
aversion” for the range of lab wealth we considered. The experimental design involved them each
making 6 binary choices in the wider battery of binary choices we consider below. Table 2 shows the
18 lottery pairs considered, spanning 17 lab wealth levels. Subjects were randomized to 6 lottery choice
pairs from the 18 shown in Table 2. Hence the lab wealth varied for each subject over their 6 choices
and we have pooled data spanning the lab wealth levels shown in Table 2. The gains and losses in
absolute value were paired for each subject over different lab wealth levels: for example, +180 and -
160 for lab wealth levels of 300 (.$45) and 2700 (.$406). Although we refer to “lab wealth,” all that
the subject saw was a lottery that had one outcome with a probability of 1, and another lottery with
the usual risky outcomes.23 Hence we did not use language or framing that would lead subjects to be
23 An alternative way to add a lab wealth component might be to randomly add it to the show-up fee
for participating in the experiment. The problem with this approach is that it would raise a potential confound
due to sample selection issues. Subjects are typically told this show-up fee, and variations in the non-
stochastic earnings component of expected earnings from participation could affect response rates and the
risk attitudes of those attending (the higher the non-stochastic component, ceteris paribus, the less risk averse
would be the selected sample if there is non-increasing absolute risk aversion over the relevant range). This is
known in the broader experimental design literature as a “randomization bias,” and is of course a particular
problem if subjects know that there will be a random component to their earnings or outcomes, such as when
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more or less inclined to integrate it into their extra-lab, “field wealth.” Nor were the outcomes in the
risky lottery presented as deviations from the certain outcome of the non-risky lottery, which might
also encourage framing. For example, subjects were asked to choose between 2,700 kroner for sure
and the risky lottery with outcomes 2,540 kroner and 2,880 kroner (Table 2, last row). With perfect
asset integration, 2,540 kroner adds to the subject’s wealth no matter what the subject’s choice is, so
we refer to 2,540 kroner as “lab wealth.”
Figure 2 shows the findings with a random effects panel probit model, since there is no need
here for structural estimation of risk preferences. We find no significant evidence of a decline in risk
aversion for lab wealth levels over the range considered here, and the risk neutral prediction of always
choosing the risky option clearly exceeds the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for all lab
wealth levels. So we conclude that the evidence for these adult Danes and these levels of lab wealth
does not lead us to reject supposition R, that “the agent turns down small-stakes gambles in favor of a
certain amount with a slightly lower expected value, and does so over a large enough range of wealth
levels W.”
Since supposition R, one of the premises of the calibration critique, is not rejected, there is a
need to examine the partial asset integration specification proposed earlier.
B. Basic Results on Asset Integration for Representative Agents
We now employ the full sample of 442 Danes, and all of the 60 binary choices each of them
made. Table 3 shows initial maximum likelihood estimates of the utility function (3N). We assume
initially that every adult Dane in our sample has the same ordinal preferences over w and y (when
there is no risk), as well as the same coefficient r, to provide a simple starting point. The coefficient r
is estimated precisely, as is the parameter ω reflecting the weight attached to wealth. We find that the
a randomized control trial is assigning them to treatment. Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2009] provide
evidence for this effect in Denmark. Even if one can then estimate the sample selection effect, by knowing
which subjects received which show-up fee, it means that inferences about lab wealth and risk aversion have
to be undertaken jointly with inferences about sample selection bias.
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weight attached to wealth is virtually zero, and statistically not different from zero. This is a
fundamental result, since it means that the PAI specification collapses to the NAI specification in this
pooled estimation, and we reject the FAI hypothesis. It also means that it is virtually impossible, for
sensible economic reasons, to identify the substitutability between w and y. We find an estimate of ρ
of 0.89, implying an estimate of σ of 6.37, but since there is virtually no weighted wealth to substitute
with, these values have little economic meaning.
Average net wealth in the estimation sample is 3,074,678 kroner (.$462,845), so these
estimates imply that individuals behave as if they evaluate experimental income relative to a weighted
baseline wealth of ω×w = 3074678 × 0.00000625 = 19 kroner (.$2.86). This is effectively zero in
economic terms: for example, it would currently only get half of an Egg McMuffin Value Meal in a
Danish McDonalds. Another way to evaluate this weighted baseline wealth estimate of 19 kroner is by
comparison with the lottery prizes, which ranged between 0 kroner and 6,750 kroner (.$1016).
Needless to say, we can easily reject the hypothesis of FAI since ω . 0, and the formal p-value on the
test of this hypothesis is 0.77.
Another way to see these results, perhaps more intuitively, is to see if measures of Net Wealth
correlate with risk attitudes in a reduced form manner. We do this by estimating the EUT-NAI model
and asking if the coefficient r is significantly affected by Net Wealth: in this case we model r as a linear
function of some covariates. Our structural results suggest that they should not, since Net Wealth is
“zeroed” out by a very low estimate of ω, at least when we assume homogeneous risk preferences. If we include
Net Wealth the effect on r is -0.004 with a p-value of 0.45; if we include a dummy for the top quartile
of Net Wealth the effect on r is +0.004 with a p-value of 0.93; if we include the 5 major components
of Net Wealth we have a joint effect that has a p-value of 0.45, and no component has an individual
effect with a p-value below 0.23. On the other hand, when we include the components of Net Wealth
and some basic demographics (gender, age, marital status, household size, and net income) we do find a
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significant joint effect of the components of Net Wealth with a p-value of 0.005, and the individual
component net deposits (with financial institutions) has a significant individual effect of -0.07 with a p-
value of 0.003. These results point to the importance of controlling for heterogeneity, and we do that
below by estimating the model for each individual, thereby allowing implicitly for all observable and
unobservable individual characteristics.
C. Payoff Calibration Implications for EUT
Using these estimates and the average value of wealth in Denmark we can evaluate the
Certainty Equivalents (CE) of a range of lotteries varying in the scale of the stakes. Implausible
implications for large stakes can be detected through an extremely low ratio of CE to the Expected
Value (EV).24
Table 4 shows implied CE values using the CRRA utility function (3N) and the parameter
estimates in Table 3. Let H denote a high prize and L denote a low prize, for H>L. The CE in Table 4
is then the sure amount of money that has the same expected utility to the individual as the lottery that
pays H with probability p and L with probability (1-p). In Panel A of Table 4 the CE solves
U(w, CE) = p × U(w, H) + (1-p) × U(w, L). (14)
So this CE solves for risky income in the experiment, and the stakes are chosen to be within the
payoff domain in our experiments. The smallest ratio of CE to EV in Table 4 is 0.362, and most are
much higher: these ratios are hardly implausible in the sense of the term used by Hansson [1988],
Rabin [2000], Neilson [2001], Rieger and Wang [2006], Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Safra and Segal
[2008]. Figure 3 displays CE values for a wide range of lotteries that are comparable to those in Table
4, with varying values of H and L and probability ½. Again we observe plausible ratios between the
CE and EV of a wide range of lotteries. 
Figure 4 evaluates the traditional Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (RRA) in (4) for
24 Similar results are obtained with median wealth instead of average wealth. The ratio of EV to CE is
slightly lower, but close to those reported here.
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the estimated EUT-PAI model. The wealth levels in each panel range up to 5 million kroner. Panel A
displays RRA for low stakes lottery prizes up to 10,000 kroner, and Panel B displays RRA for high
stakes lottery prizes up to 1 million kroner. Both Panel A and Panel B shows modest levels of risk
aversion for a wide range of wealth and experimental payoffs.
Using these estimates (see Table 3) one can verify that (a) getting 190 with probability ½ and 0
with probability ½ is rejected in favor of getting 75 for sure, for all wealth amounts smaller than 35
million; and (b) the same utility function exhibits plausible risk aversion in Table 4 for large stakes.
Under FAI, no EUT-consistent agent can exhibit both (a) and (b).
It is, however, possible to come up with some edge cases in which the predictions of EUT-
PAI are implausible. For example, at a wealth level of 307 kroner, a low prize of 0, and a high prize of
5,000 kroner, we get very low ratios of CE to EV, between 0.0004 and 0.12, for probabilities between
0.01 and 0.3 on the large prize. As the wealth level increases to the mean wealth level of 3,074,678
kroner, the same example generates low ratios between 0.02 and 0.12 for probabilities between 0.01
and 0.2 on the high prize. We return to compare results for these special cases when we allow for
RDU risk preferences.
D. Probability Weighting
The RDU model estimates with the PAI specification are shown in Table 5, and show
evidence of slight probability weighting pessimism. Compared to the EUT estimates for the PAI
specification, there is less curvature on the utility of outcomes once the possibility of probability
pessimism is allowed for.25 We can easily reject the assumption that there is no probability weighting (η
= φ=1), and this is reflected in the improved log-likelihood with the RDU model over EUT. The
25 In other words, for the same choice data, the EUT and RDU models decompose the same risk
premium in a different way. The EUT model ascribes all of the risk premium to UO<0, and the RDU model
explains the risk premium with UO<0 as well as probability pessimism. Since probability pessimism, ceteris
paribus UO, generates a risk premium itself, the net effect must be for there to be less diminishing marginal
utility under RDU than there is under EUT.
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extent of probability weighting, and implications for decision weights, are shown in Figure 5. The left
panel of Figure 5 shows the probability weighting function. The decision weight for the top prize is
read directly off the probability weighting function, and the decision weights for the smaller prizes are
then derived according to (11a) and (11b). The right panel of Figure 5 shows an example in which the
probabilities on three prizes are each assumed to be a, in order to illustrate the pure effect of
probability weighting, and the dashed line then shows the effect of the probability weighting curvature
in the left panel. So we see that the weight given to the best prize drops from 0.33 to 0.30, while the
weight given to the worst prize increases from 0.33 to 0.41. In terms of PAI, the estimates are similar
to those under EUT except that there is slightly more substitutability between wealth and lab payoffs:
in particular, the fundamental finding that ω . 0 is the same.
The overall log-likelihood of the RDU-PAI model is the best of the RDU specifications
considered (RDU-NAI, RDU-PAI and RDU-FAI). We can formally reject the FAI hypotheses since ω
is estimated precisely, ω . 0, and we cannot formally reject the null hypothesis that ω = 0 at any
conventional statistical level. For the same reasons, we cannot reject the NAI hypothesis either. These
are important insights, since they are based on wealth data that is as accurate and complete as it is
possible to get for any population.
For reasons already noted for the EUT-PAI model, when ω 6 0 the economic meaning of the
parameters defining the substitutability if w and y disappears. We formally estimate ρ to be 0.9999927,
with a standard error that spans 1, so it is no surprise that the estimate of σ = 1/(1-ρ) is extremely
high, at 137,913, and with a large standard error. Again, these wild numerical values follow directly
from the economics of the CES function (2) when ω 6 0, and have no substantive significance or
effect on the other parameter estimates (i.e., one could just as easily have constrained ρ = 1 and
inferred essentially the same estimates).
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E. Payoff Calibration Implications for RDU
Using the RDU-PAI estimates from Table 5, we can again evaluate the ratio of the CE to the
EV for a range of low stakes and high stakes lotteries. Using the same lotteries as in Table 4, in Table
6 the CE now solves
U(w, CE) = h(p) × U(w, H) + (1-h(p)) × U(w, L) (15)
The smallest ratio of CE to EV in Table 6 is 0.478, and most are much higher, exactly as in Table 4. In
general the ratios in Tables 4 and 6 are similar. Figure 6 provides an overview of a range of CE values
in relation to the EV, again using lotteries comparable to Table 6. It is easy to verify that the RDU-
PAI model also satisfies the payoff calibration conditions noted earlier for the EUT-PAI model.
Again, as with the EUT-PAI estimates, using these RDU-PAI estimates one can verify that (a)
getting 190 with probability ½ and 0 with probability ½ is rejected in favor of getting 75 for sure, for
all wealth amounts smaller than 15.8 million; and (b) the same utility function exhibits plausible risk
aversion in Table 6 for large stakes. Under FAI, no RDU-consistent agent can exhibit both (a) and
(b).26
Using these RDU estimates, we can reconsider the edge cases noted earlier, under EUT-PAI,
in which the PAI predictions are implausible. Under EUT-PAI, at the low wealth level of 307, the
ratio of CE to EV was between 0.0004 and 0.12 for probabilities between 0.01 and 0.3 on the large
prize: with RDU-PAI these ratios are between 0.04 and 0.27, which range from implausible to
plausible. The ratio is 0.09, 0.13 and 0.20 for probabilities on the large prize of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2,
26 Although these exercises showing how a representative agent would react to various risky contexts
are informative about average behavior, they do not allow for heterogeneity in preferences. In fact, the
estimate of ω may, in part, reflect heterogeneity in risk attitudes that just happens to be correlated with wealth,
rather than some true relation between risk attitudes and wealth. Under CRRA, for any given value of r, a
higher wealth level would predict more risk taking choices in the lottery tasks. Without having observations
where wealth varies at the individual subject level, this possibility cannot be ruled out. Thus, if the true
preferences are NAI, a positive ω could just be reflecting the possibility that, in our sample, the subjects with
higher wealth are less risk averse. Or, if the true preferences are FAI, ω < 1 could just be reflecting the
possibility that, in our sample, the subjects with higher wealth are more risk averse.
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respectively. As the wealth level increases to the mean wealth level of 3,074,678 kroner, the same
example generates plausible ratios under RDU-PAI between 0.26 and 0.31 for probabilities between
0.01 and 0.2 on the high prize.
These edge cases show that although the PAI model can accommodate risk version at small
and large stakes at the same time, there remain cases falsifying the model. These edge cases allow us to
identify the limits of the PAI approach as it is specified here. However, considering a more flexible
specification of ω, where it varies with context, could accommodate these edge cases. When RDU-PAI
fails to work in this edge cases, so does RDU-NAI. However, the RDU-PAI prediction becomes
plausible at wealth levels that are large enough to make baseline wealth ω×w meaningful for
predictions with stochastic income.  In contrast, the performance of RDU-NAI cannot improve with
increasing wealth levels.  This also applies to Cumulative Prospect Theory, which is equivalent to
RDU-NAI when all choices are made on the gain domain. With the exception of the edge cases, the
PAI model does well, as illustrated by the examples in Tables 4 and 6. It does particularly well when
paired with the RDU model of decision-making under risk.
F. Estimates for Individual Subjects
By and large the estimates at the level of the individual are consistent with the conclusions
from the pooled models. We continue to find considerable support for the PAI specification
converging to the NAI specification, and virtually no support for the FAI specification. But we do
observe some considerable heterogeneity, and some interesting special cases.
An Appendix documents the main findings from the individual subject estimates on an
unconditional basis. Here we document the findings after conditioning on which model of decision-
making under risk best characterizes each individual (EUT or RDU), and then conditioning on the
statistical significance of parameter estimates (e.g., if the estimate of ω > 0 but is not statistically
significantly different from 0, we set it to 0). This way of presenting results is more intuitive: one
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should not look at EUT results for an individual better characterized as RDU, and one should not
ignore the statistical significance of results when reporting findings. All statements about statistical
significance will be using a 5% two-sided test, but we have complete results using a 1% or 10% level,
and nothing changes with respect to the qualitative conclusions. We also have to condition statements
on the fact that, as always happens with individual-level estimation, there is a fraction of individuals
and model specifications that do not solve numerically.
We find that a relatively high 68% of the sample are better characterized as RDU decision-
makers than EUT decision-makers. The formal test here is that π(p)=p, which is the case when η = φ
= 1 from the probability weighting function (12). We say that this fraction is relatively high given our
priors from the same calculations with university student pools from the United States (Harrison and
Ng [2016]). This 68% refers to 287 subjects out of the 421 for which we had valid estimates; there
were only 21 subjects for which we had no estimates of either the EUT or RDU specification. So we
have a clear majority of subjects for whom we should not look at results that assume EUT.
Table 7 collates the individual estimates. Panel A show the range of estimates of ω, and we
find that 82% [89%] of the subjects have an estimate of ω that is less than 0.001 [0.05] under the
preferred PAI specification (viz., EUT-PAI or RDU-PAI). Recall that this includes all subjects with
statistically insignificant estimates of ω, irrespective of the point estimate of ω, which we set to zero.27
Of course, before we conclude that these individuals are approximating NAI, we need to match these
ω estimates with the Net Wealth w that each subject has.
Panel B shows the range of estimates of r, and we see that 39% (= 19% + 20%) of subjects
have an estimate that lies between 0 and 1, reflecting modest risk aversion.28 Some of these cases
27 Table B3 in Appendix B shows the same tabulations based solely on point estimates, with no
regard for statistical significance. 
28 We merge the cells for the case in which 0.5 # r < 1 and r $ 1 to avoid reporting cells referring to
individuals that have too small a frequency count, so as to ensure confidentiality. We retain the detailed rows
to facilitate comparison with unconditional tabulations in Appendix B.
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reflect estimates of r that are not statistically significantly different from zero.29 Of course, under RDU
the coefficient r is only a part of the characterization of risk attitudes, and one has to attend to the
effects of probability weighting as well.
Panel C shows a cross-tabulation of these estimates of ω and r. We find that 152 ( =
61+77+9+5) of the 442 subjects have estimates of ω between 0 and 0.05 and estimates of r between 0
and 1, reflecting modest risk aversion. We find that 310 (= 152+147+11) of the 442 subjects have
estimates of ω between 0 and 0.05 and estimates of r above or equal to 0 reflecting risk aversion. 
Panel D is an important complement to Panel A, since it multiplies the estimate of ω for the
individual by the Net Wealth w of the same individual, telling us in effect what weighted baseline wealth 
the individual aggregates with experimental income. We find that 77% of subjects behave as if
employing a weighted baseline wealth less than 10 kroner, which is effectively zero in terms of
implications for calibration. A further 6% of the sample have weighted baseline wealth between 10
kroner and 1,000 kroner (.$150), 8% have weighted baseline wealth between 1,000 and 100,000
kroner (.$15,053), and 3% have weighted baseline wealth over 100,000 kroner. So this is an important
pattern of heterogeneity, illustrating, in contrast to Panel A, why it is important to look at the
interaction of the ω parameter with individual Net Wealth w. Panel E provides a cross-tabulation of
these estimates of ω×w and r, akin to Panel C.
Figures 7 and 8 display the implications for the Arrow-Pratt measure of RRA in (4) for the
average parameter values of representative individuals of two sub-samples of subjects with non-trivial
levels of weighted baseline wealth ω×w.30 Figure 7 shows results for a representative agent with
29 Appendix B tabulates the unconditional estimates with no allowance for the preferred model of risk
preferences or statistical significance (Tables B1 and B2). It also tabulates (Table B3) the estimates that only
condition on the preferred model of risk preferences for each subject, and not on that preferred model and
statistical significance as in Table 7.
30 We focus on the implications for RRA from the utility function, and set aside implications from
any probability weighting. As it happens, there is relatively little probability weighting from a substantive point
of view, even if it is statistically significant. Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B display the estimated probability
weighting functions and implications for decision weights, corresponding to Figures 7 and 8, respectively.
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weighted baseline wealth between 10,000 kroner and 100,000 kroner, and Figure 8 shows results for a
representative agent with weighted baseline wealth between 100,000 kroner and 1 million kroner.
Figures 7 and 8 each pool sub-samples of individual estimates, spanning EUT-PAI and RDU-PAI
subjects. In each case we observe considerable variation in RRA as wealth varies, but no levels of RRA
that would seem implausible in the sense of the calibration critiques. These are important sub-samples,
because their levels of weighted baseline wealth mean that they do not collapse to NAI, where we
know that small stakes and large stakes risk aversion are plausible for our subjects. In the case of the
individual agents included in Figure 7 we have an example of PAI, with ω = 0.045 (hence weighted
baseline wealth of between 450 kroner and 4,500 kroner), ρ = 0.66 and σ = 7.7. This elasticity of
substitution is not 4, but it is very high for all practical purposes. But the fact that only 4.5% of wealth
is integrated with experimental prizes, and this represents an amount in the range of the experimental
prizes, points to PAI. For the individual agents in Figure 8 we have another example of PAI, with ω =
0.13, ρ = 0.31 and σ = 1.5.
Our earlier evaluations of the payoff calibration implications of the aggregate estimates for the
RDU-PAI model, in Figure 6, provide a simple way to characterize the payoff calibration implications
for the complete set of individual estimates. For each subject we can repeat the simulations underlying
Figure 6, but using the estimates for that individual and the Net Wealth for that individual. EUT
subjects are simply RDU subjects for whom η = φ = 1, so can be included in the same simulations
correctly. We can then summarize the ratio of CE to EV across all subjects and simulated choices:
there is an average of 0.83 and a median of 0.96. The complete distribution of these ratios does reveal
some low ratios, and some ratios indicating risk-loving choices, reflecting the heterogeneity of risk
preferences and lotteries evaluated. But the overall pattern confirms our general finding of plausible
patterns of risk aversion.
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5. Related Literature and Generalizations
A. Related Literature
The closest data source is compiled by Schechter [2007], based on a sample of 188 rural
Paraguayan households that made one lottery choice in an experiment and provided self-reported
measures of daily income. She focuses on the integration of experimental payoffs with daily income on
the day of the experiment, assuming it is all consumed on that day, and also with the integration of
experimental payoffs with the present value of that daily income when inter-day savings are allowed.
In each case she only considers full asset integration, in which experimental payoffs are added to daily
income, and the intertemporal utility function is linear in current and future utility. She also reports the
availability of a measure of household physical wealth, given by the self-reported value of land, animals
and tools. She does not report any measures of financial wealth, which may have been negligible for
this population.
Several studies of insurance data have attempted to estimate large-stakes risk aversion. The
problem with naturally occurring data, of course, is identification. This is where the trade-off between
controlled lab or field experiments and naturally occurring data is most clearly seen. In our case we
have artefactual field experiments with non-students that are representative of a broader population,
so we have “complete control” over the design of the lotteries. This permits us to conduct direct tests
of one of the premises of the calibration critique, as well as ensure that we obtain well-identified
estimates for each individual of EUT and RDU models of risk preferences. We also have the unusual
advantage of being able to merge in naturally occurring data, the Net Wealth of the same individuals
that made these lottery choices. Reliance on naturally occurring data generally makes it impossible to
draw the sorts of inferences we can, but of course has the advantage of referring to non-artefactual
choices over risk. We see the two approaches as complementary, each with strengths and limitations.
In some cases naturally occurring data allows relatively refined inferences about large-stakes risk
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aversion, as illustrated in several classic studies looking at behavior towards insurance deductibles.
Cohen and Einav [2007] examine a rich data-set of choices over menus of deductibles and
premium payments for auto insurance that varied across individuals. They know the premium offered,
but do not know the subjective perception of the risk of a claim, or the risk that the claim will be paid
in full. To proxy the latter they assume that individuals have accurate point estimates of the true
distribution, a tenuous assumption, even for experienced drivers. Moreover, they must assume EUT,
since they have no way to identify non-EUT models of risk preferences, and hence the calibration
implications of such preferences.31 Certain non-EUT models of risk preferences, such as RDU, have
been shown to dramatically affect the valuation of insurance when calibrated to estimates from real
choices (Hansen, Jacobsen and Lau [2016]). 
The same confounding issue arises in the evaluation by Sydnor [2010] of choices over
deductibles on home insurance. By choosing lower deductibles the individual is paying a lower, certain
premium, in return for a risky return given by the claim rate, and the subjective perception of how often
the individual expects to make a claim in the next year. Since these are lower deductibles, there is no
risk attached to the amount that is saved by the lower deductible, so risk preferences do not play a role
in this decision under EUT. But it is easy to imagine an RDU agent viewing the actual claims rate
“optimistically” enough to justify these deductibles.32 Again, nothing in these data allow one to identify
the parameters of the simplest RDU model, hence identify the calibration implications for such a
31 Cohen and Einav [2006] explicitly “take a neutral position” (p. 746) with respect to the calibration
implications of their analysis, recognizing that “avoiding this debate is also a drawback” (p. 747) of their
approach. Of course, their analysis was not intended to contribute to the debate over the calibration critique.
32 For example, the modal choice from the sample was to pay $100 to get a $500 reduction in the
deductible. The actual claims rate was 0.043 in this case, at least for the claims that resulted in a payout. An
RDU decision-maker with a power probability weighting function π(p) = pγ would only need γ = 0.5 to have a
weighted probability and decision weight of 0.21, exceeding the 0.2 needed to justify the purchase. And it is
reasonable to expect that some households might perceive the true probability as higher than 0.043, requiring
even less optimism to justify the purchase. The estimated probability weighting function of Barseghyan et al.
[2013; Figure 2 or Figure 4], for comparable choices by samples from comparable populations, implies a
weighted probability of roughly 0.11 if one uses the actual claims rate of 0.043. Of course, this is still a
violation of EUT, which is the general point being made by Sydnor [2010].  
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specification.
Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue and Teitelbaum [2013] is an important advance in the
analysis of insurance deductible choice. They exploit the fact that the decision-makers in their sample
had a choice from multiple deductibles, and recognize that this allows them to identify the role of
diminishing marginal utility and probability weighting, since these two channels for a risk premium
have different implications at different deductible levels. They also recognize that what they call
probability weighting might also be simply subjective risk perceptions that differ from the true claims
rate, an important issue we return to later. Their striking result is that probability overweighting with
respect to claims is, along with diminishing marginal utility, a central determinant of the risk
preferences of these deductible choices. They use semi-parametric methods to infer the probability
weighting function. Although such methods have some obvious attractions, they can lead to a priori
implausible results, such as the massive jump discontinuity from the infamous probability weighting
function sketch of Kahneman and Tversky [1979; Figure 4, p. 283]: claims rates of zero imply
weighted claims rates of 6.5%, with 95% confidence intervals spanning 6% and 10% (Figure 1). They
also estimate CRRA coefficients of 0.37 and 0.21 (p. 2524), comparable to the 0.48 we estimate in our
RDU-PAI specification (Table 5). 
When it comes to implications for the calibration critique, Barseghyan et al. [2013; p. 2527]
hedge, suggesting that their relatively low estimate of UO “suggests that it may be possible” to explain
low-stakes and high-stakes risk aversion while maintaining “standard risk aversion,” by which they
mean some degree of diminishing marginal utility. If one interprets their probability weighting in terms
of an RDU model, they still require a deviation from EUT. On the other hand, they openly
acknowledge that their analysis “does not enable us to say whether households are engaging in
probability weighting per se or whether their subjective beliefs about risk simply do not correspond to
the objective probabilities.” (p. 2527). The latter explanation when it requires additivity is just
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Subjective Expected Utility, which does not require that subjective beliefs be correct or even updated
according to Bayes Rule.33 We return to the role of subjective beliefs below.
It is possible to write down non-EUT models that can explain small-stakes risk aversion as
well as large-stakes risk aversion. For instance, Ang, Bekaert and Liu [2005], building on Epstein and
Zin [1990], show that a recursive utility specification with a non-EU, first-order34 risk averse certainty
equivalent, can account for both types of risk aversion. Our approach does not require than one adopt
a non-EU specification, but of course allows for that as we illustrate with our RDU-PAI specification.
Loss aversion was suggested by Rabin [2000] and Rabin and Thaler [2001] as a possible
explanation for first-order risk aversion over small-stakes lotteries. These suggestions are more
formally developed in Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006], discussed below. Our results show that loss
aversion is not necessary to account for small-stakes risk aversion and large-stakes risk aversion: none
of the lotteries our subjects faced were in the loss domain or mixed domain, if one views the status
quo as the reference point. Just as we were able to extend our PAI approach to consider RDU, one
could extend it to Cumulative Prospect Theory, with appropriate formal modifications noted earlier.
B. Generalizations
As flexible as our approach is in comparison to the full integration and no integration special
cases that have dominated the discussion, it is still something of a “reduced form” approach to the 
structural question of the joint determination of lab and non-lab choices. In effect, we take the myriad
33 Some economists view Bayes Rule as a part of Subjective Expected Utility, but it is not. The
literature in behavioral finance is clear about these two being separate, even if it challenges the descriptive
validity of both. Barberis and Thaler [2005; p.1] open their survey by noting that “The traditional finance
paradigm [...] seeks to understand financial markets using models in which agents are ‘rational.’ Rationality
means two things. First, when they receive new information, agents update their beliefs correctly, in the
manner described by Bayes’s law. Second, given their beliefs, agents make choices that are normatively
acceptable, in the sense that they are consistent with Savage’s notion of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU).”
34 First-order risk aversion refers to a utility functional that can exhibit risk aversion for small prizes.
Under FAI, and assuming wealth is significant, a differentiable utility function does not exhibit first-order risk
aversion, though it can at non-differentiable points (Segal and Spivak [1990]). Under NAI it does. In context,
the reference in the text is to a “disappointment aversion” model.
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of decisions underlying w to be given, implicitly assuming that all components of w are symmetric in
their relation to y. Given the importance of the issue, we sketch several deeper issues that must be
addressed as one generalizes our approach.
In general, it need not be the case that there is symmetry with respect to components of w and
experimental choices over y. This is immediately problematic when one considers experimental
interventions in the field that offer choices over vectors of commodities rather than just money. For
example, the experimental provision of a subsidized microinsurance product over one type of
stochastic outcome, such as the weather, might be expected to interact with cropping choices
differently than family planning decisions or retirement decisions. Closer to our setting, some
components of w, such as more liquid components of wealth, might be viewed as closer substitutes to
experimental income than others.35 These extensions can be immediately captured with nested-CES
aggregator functions, of the kind that are common in demand analysis and computable general
equilibrium modeling.36
In a related vein, individual wealth might be viewed as a closer substitute to experimental
income that the individual is choosing over, and other household wealth as not perfectly fungible with
individual wealth. Or we might consider an intertemporal utility function defined over stochastic
prizes to be paid today and stochastic prizes to be paid in the future (Kihlstrom [2009] and Andersen,
35 We can consider those subjects that have more than the median fraction of Net Wealth in relatively
liquid form, which in our case refers to net assets in financial institutions, bonds, and shares. For simplicity of
interpretation, we focus just on point estimates, without conditioning on the statistical significance of the
estimate (hence the comparison is to Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B). Around 77% of these subjects are
RDU-consistent. Just over 92% of these subjects have an ω less than 0.05, and 85% have an ω less than 0.001;
79%, 83% and 90%, respectively, have a weighted baseline wealth ω × w less than 10 kroner, 1,000 kroner,
and 100,000 kroner, respectively. Just over 86% of these subjects have a coefficient of relative risk aversion
for the composite, r, greater than 0 and less than 0.5. Hence we conclude that these subjects are actually closer
to NAI than the typical subject (the comparison is primarily to Table B2, but the same conclusions hold if one
compares to Tables B1 or B2). 
36 The nested-CES class allows global regularity and local flexibility in the specification proposed by
Perroni and Rutherford [1995]. Many specifications that allow local flexibility trade off global regularity, an
important property for calibration critiques.
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Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2016]).37 In essence, wealth held as financial assets are simply claims on
future income in this manner, thus motivating interest in such intertemporal utility functions.
The first issue is to consider multivariate measures of risk aversion. Kihlstrom and Mirman
[1974] posed this issue under the restrictive assumption that the ordinal preferences underlying two
expected utility functions exhibit the same preferences over non-stochastic outcomes. In this case they
propose a scalar measure of total risk aversion that allows one to make statements about whether one
person is more risk averse than another in several dimensions, or if the same person is more risk
averse after some event than before.
If one relaxes this assumption, which is not an attractive one in many applications, Duncan
[1977] shows that the Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] multivariate measure of risk aversion naturally
becomes matrix-valued. Hence one has vector-valued risk premia, and this vector is not “direction
dependent” in terms of evaluation. Karni [1979] shows that one can define the risk premia in terms of
the expenditure function, rather than the direct utility function, and then evaluate it “uniquely” by
further specifying an interesting statistic of the stochastic process. For example, if one is considering
risk attitudes towards a vector of stochastic price shocks, then one could use the mean of those
shocks.
A closely related literature defines multi-attribute risk aversion where the utility function is
defined over more than one attribute. In our case one attribute would be experimental payoffs y and
the other attribute would be extra-experimental wealth w. In this context, Keeney [1973] first defined
the concept of conditional risk aversion, Richard [1975] defined the same concept as bivariate risk
aversion, and Epstein and Tanny [1980] defined it as correlation aversion.38 There are several ways to
37 One might argue that some of these examples of imperfect substitutes derive from the absence of
perfect capital markets. For example, in the intertemporal case the existence of perfect capital markets implies
the familiar Fisherian (non-)separation theorem. In these cases one would simply restate results in terms of
indirect utility functions.
38 Several studies note that the core concept appeared as early as de Finetti [1952], but this was
written in Italian and we cannot verify that claim.
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extend these pairwise concepts of risk aversion over two attributes to more than two attributes, as
reviewed by Dorfleitner and Krapp [2007].
One attraction of the concept of multiattribute risk aversion is that it allows a relatively simple
characterization of the functional forms for utility that rule out multiattribute risk attitudes: additivity.
One can have an additive multiattribute utility function and still exhibit partial, or single-attribute, risk
aversion. Similarly, one can generate results that do not depend on partial, single-attribute risk
aversion, but could still depend on multiattribute risk aversion.39 For multivariate risk aversion one has
to check if the Hessian is negative semidefinite under the Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] definition, but
that is not hard for specific numerical ranges. For example, the specific parametric form (3N) can easily
be shown to be negative semidefinite. Applying the matrix-valued measures of Duncan [1977] and
Karni [1979] would be more involved, of course.
A simple, but important, application of the concept of multiattribute aversion, referred to
above as correlation aversion, is when considering intertemporal utility functions. In this case allowing
for a non-additive intertemporal utility function allows one to tease apart “a-temporal risk
preferences” from “time preferences”, especially temporally correlated risk preferences. In this
application one attribute is the amount of money involved (more or less) and the other attribute is
when it is paid (sooner or later). This approach can be directly implemented in controlled experiments,
as illustrated by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2016]. For present purposes, it can be viewed
as another application of the idea of bivariate risk aversion, which is the same idea as our concept of
partial asset integration over a-temporal w and y.
39 For example, Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman [2011] correctly note that their utility function in
effort and payoff generates optimal effort levels that do not depend on risk attitudes towards payoff by itself.
But the absence of any role for multi-attribute risk attitudes is due to their approximation of an additive two-
argument utility function. Hence their inferences from observed behavior about the role of reference points
could, in principle, be confounded. The same issue arises when modeling the tradeoff between leisure and
income in the labor supply literature addressing the effort pattern of New York taxi drivers over time: see
equations (1) and (2), each additive, in Farber [2005; p.53].
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The second broad set of issues is the characterization of behavior when portfolio choices are
disaggregated, and when they are integrated with consumption and leisure choices. Within the field of
insurance economics, Mayers and Smith [1983] and Doherty [1984] have stressed the confounding
effect that allowing for non-traded assets can have on the demand for insurance. For example, if risks
in one domain are perfectly correlated with risks in another domain, but traded insurance is only
available in one domain, the rational risk-averse agent would tend to “over-insure.” The entire theory
of risk management derives from the complementarity and substitutability of “self protection” and
“self insurance” activities with formal insurance purchases identified by Ehrlich and Becker [1972].
The joint modeling of consumption behavior, leisure demand and portfolio choices begun, with non-
additive utility functions, by Cox [1975] and Ingersoll [1992] identifies numerous avenues for testable
propositions about the unexpected spillover effects of policy interventions. There is also a large
literature on the effects of consumption “commitments” on behavior towards risk, starting with
Grossman and Laroque [1990] and applied directly to the issue of risk calibration by Chetty and Szeidl
[2007]. Finally, the partial asset integration approach could provide a rigorous bridge to characterizing
the manner in which decision makers employ “mental accounts” to structure the tradeoffs between
components of w and y, in the spirit of Thaler [1985] and Thaler and Johnson [1990].40 The hypothesis
40 Thaler and Johnson [1990] focused directly on the question of how risk-taking behavior is affected
by prior gains or losses, and do not directly consider integration with wealth. But the issues they examine with
respect to the “components of y” have direct application to the generalization we propose. They view choices
from the perspective of Prospect Theory (PT), but allow for interesting variations in the manner in which the
“editing phase” of PT is applied. They provide (p.646) a simple example in which the subject is told that they
have just won $30, and must then choose between (a) no further gain or loss, or (b) a 50-50 chance of
winning $9 or losing $9. Three representations of this problem are suggested: (a) u($21) + w(½) [ u($39) -
u($21) ]; (b) u($30) + w(½) u($9) + w(½) u(-$9); and (c) u($21) + w(½) u($18). The representation in (a)
assumes that prior outcomes are embedded into the choice problem. In effect, it adds “memory” to the
standard PT representation of the task, and then applies the PT editing rule that the prospect is broken into
the certain part and then the residual uncertain part (Kahneman and Tversky [1979; p.276]). The
representation in (b) assumes that prior outcomes, in this case the $30 of cumulative income, has no effect on
the framing of the task. This is the standard PT formulation. The difference between (a) and (b) has
something of the flavor of the asset integration parameter ω that we introduced. But it also has something of
the flavor of an endogenous reference point for PT. The representation in (c) assumes that subjects actively
deform the prospect to make it appear more attractive. Thus the possibility of a $9 loss is integrated into the
$30 on hand, to be evaluated as a certain $21, and the risky part of the gamble is evaluated as a potential gain
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of mental accounts involves testable statements about the nested nature of substitutability between
different components of w and/or y, and the possibility that ω is context dependent. Once we
consider a wider range of stakes, both for income and wealth, there are many ways of characterizing
the relationship between risk attitudes over these utility arguments. Such specifications are discussed in
the broader literature on multivariate and mult-attribute risk aversion.
A third set of broad issues has to do with the treatment of wealth as being deterministic and
known, while experimental income is stochastic by experimental design. Although consistent with the
manner in which asset integration is discussed in the literature, our PAI approach formally allows for
there to be a joint probability distribution over wealth and experimental income. An important
extension would be to elicit subjective beliefs from individuals about the value of their net wealth at
the time of the experiment (or as of some very recent date).41 After all, who knows with certainty the
current value of their net wealth?  Since the correlation between subjective beliefs about own-wealth
and experimental income is zero, again by design, one can just elicit beliefs about wealth and then
construct the joint distribution as a mixture of subjective beliefs about own-wealth and objective
probabilities in the experimental lotteries.
This extension connects our approach to the logic of Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006], who
emphasize the role of risks from gambles such as one confronts in an experiment being merged with
pre-existing risks from extra-experimental income or wealth. If the risks in the experimental lottery are
of $18. 
41 Formal methods for eliciting subjective belief distributions with incentives are provided by
Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2016] and Harrison and Ulm [2016]. In the Danish context
we can determine the net wealth of an individual, and it’s components, in the manner presented here.
Although there is a lag of just over a year, one can elicit beliefs about wealth as of that date as a proxy for
beliefs about current wealth. After the subjective belief distribution is elicited, there is then a further question
about how the individual processes that distribution. If the individual behaves as if the Reduction of
Compound Lotteries applies, the weighted average of the distribution can be employed in the analysis, so the
joint distribution is then defined over (subjective and objective) risk. If that axiom is not consistent with
behavior, and Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2015] and others present convincing evidence that it
is often violated, one would have to model the effects of uncertainty or ambiguity aversion.
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independent of these pre-existing risks, the diversification benefits of the combination might offset
any first-order risk aversion towards the experimental lottery evaluated in isolation. Barberis et al.
[2006] then posit that the individual evaluates small-stakes gambles in isolation, and is driven to exhibit
first-order risk aversion, but that the same agent evaluates large-stakes gambles as part of this broader
portfolio, tempering the small-stakes risk aversion.42 Our approach does not require this state-
dependent utility specification to account for small-stakes risks and large-stakes risk, although we
certainly agree that the riskiness of wealth and experimental income ought to be considered jointly in a
complete treatment. 
This extension also connects our approach to the logic of Kőszegi and Rabin [2007], who
consider the implications of loss aversion relative to a stochastic reference point, defined in terms of
subjective beliefs about outcomes of the lottery. Recognizing that “... relatively little evidence on the
determinants of reference points currently exists,” (p. 1051), they make this notion operational by
assuming that individuals use the EV of the lottery as their subjective belief about the lottery outcome.
Our approach immediately extends to include this specification, since we formally allow a joint
probability distribution over wealth and experimental income.43
The theme of these comments is that our approach is much more general than the resolution
of a puzzle about the calibration of choices over risky y in the lab when one takes into account extra
lab w. In effect, the rigorous evaluation of seemingly arcane calibration puzzles via models of partial
asset integration opens up many areas for research that have tended to be neglected in the calibration
42 An important feature of Barberis et al. [2006] is the evaluation of small-stakes risks that are
delayed, rather than resolved immediately. This requirement differentiates their specification from the model
of Ang et al. [2005], who implicitly require these risks to be resolved immediately. Modeling risk over time
raises many new issues, which we discussed earlier: in effect it takes us to the generalization of our approach
to model multiattribute or multivariate risks.
43 Making this approach operational requires some way of jointly eliciting subjective beliefs and risk
attitudes (Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014] and Harrison and Ulm [2016]) or employing
belief elicitation procedures that do not require assumptions about risk attitudes (reviewed in Harrison,
Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2014]).
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debate.
6. Conclusions
The experimental behavior of adult Danes that have any personal wealth is consistent with
partial asset integration, in the dual sense that they behave as if some fraction of personal wealth is
combined with experimental prizes in a utility function, and that the combination entails less than
perfect substitution. Of course, those that have no wealth cannot, as a matter of definition, integrate it
with experimental income. Overall, then, we conclude that our subjects do not perfectly asset
integrate.
The implied risk attitudes from estimating these partial asset integration specifications imply
risk premia and certainty equivalents under EUT that are a priori plausible when confronted with the
payoff calibration paradox. Hence our EUT-PAI specification survives the payoff calibration paradox.
Extending the analysis to an RDU model, we find evidence of modest probability weighting
and diminishing marginal utility under partial asset integration. Only when one insists a priori, and
contrary to the inferences we draw about behavior, that decisions are best characterized with full asset
integration does probability weighting come to dominate the characterization of risk attitudes over
experimental payoffs. Nonetheless, the RDU-PAI specification also survives the payoff calibration
paradox.
These are reassuring and constructive solutions to the payoff calibration paradoxes. In
addition, the rigorous, structural modeling of partial asset integration points to a rich array of
neglected questions in risk management and policy evaluation in important field settings.
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Table 1: Individual Wealth in Denmark
All currency values in Danish Kroner (1 DKK . $6.643 in September 2015).
All valuations as of December 31, 2014, except for Automobiles, which has a 1 year lag.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
Total assets 3,844,104 2,985,522 4,521,335
    Real estate 1,427,395 1,000,828 2,734,828
    Shares and mutual funds 185,023 2,859 562,243
    Bonds 4,006 0 28,118
    Assets in financial institutions 186,747 65,762 311,192
    Pensions 1,969,176 1,162,490 2,504,648
    Automobiles 71,758 27,400 105,166
Total liabilities 769,426 352,192 2,212,928
    Debt in financial institutions 190,558 26,133 439,769
    Mortgages 578,869 0 2,023,922 
Net wealth 3,074,678 2,165,847 3,470,853
Net wealth truncated at zero 3,097,435 2,165,847 3,439,401
Note: Total assets are the market value of domestic real estate, shares and mutual funds, bonds, assets deposited in
domestic and foreign financial institutions, pensions and the value of automobiles. Total liabilities are the value of
debt in domestic and foreign financial institutions and mortgages. All values of shares, bonds and pensions are
reported by financial institutions as of December 31st. Values of real estate are estimated by Statistics Denmark as
the market value on December 31st. The value of automobiles is calculated with a one-year lag. All foreign assets
and debt are self reported and equal to 0 for every subject in the sample. All values are in 2015 Danish kroner,
and values are reported for the full sample of 442 subjects.
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Table 2: Experimental Parameters for Test of Calibration Premis
All currency values in Danish Kroner (1 DKK . $6.643 in September 2015).
Lab Wealth Risky Lottery
Loss Gain Expected Value
150 -80 90 155
225 -120 135 232.5
300 -150 160 305
300 -160 180 310
450 -225 240 457.5
600 -300 320 610
800 -150 160 805
850` -80 90 855
1200 -225 240 1207.5
1275 -120 135 1282.5
1300 -150 160 1305
1350 -80 90 1355
1600 -300 320 1610
1700 -160 180 1710
1950 -225 240 1957.5
2025 -120 135 2032.5
2600 -300 320 2610
2700 -160 180 2710
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Table 3: Estimates Using EUT-PAI Model
Sample of 442 individuals making 26,520 choices of strict preference
Log-Likelihood = -17,025 (-17,028 for NAI and -17,436 for FAI)
Null hypothesis for p-value results is that the coefficient estimates is 0.
Parameter
Point
Estimate
Standard
Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
r 0.64 0.04 <0.001 0.57 0.71
ρ 0.89 0.15 <0.001 0.6 1.19
ω 0.000006 0.00002 0.77 -0.00004 0.00005
μ 0.08 0.005 <0.001 0.07 0.09
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Table 4: Implied Certainty Equivalents Using EUT-PAI Model
Calculations with average wealth
High Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of High Prize
Low Prize
(DKK)
Expected
Value (DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
200 0.5 100 150 145 0.965
500 0.5 100 300 252 0.84
1000 0.5 100 550 402 0.73
2000 0.5 100 1,050 663 0.631
5000 0.5 100 2,550 1,350 0.529
5000 0.01 100 149 109 0.732
5000 0.1 100 590 214 0.362
5000 0.3 100 1,570 626 0.399
5000 0.7 100 3,530 2,459 0.697
5000 0.9 100 4,510 4,025 0.892
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Table 5: Estimates Using RDU-PAI Model
Sample of 442 individuals making 26,520 choices of strict preference
Log-Likelihood = -16,973 (-16,976 for NAI and -17,049 for FAI) 
Null hypothesis for p-value results is that the coefficient estimates is 0.
Parameter
Point
Estimate
Standard
Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
r 0.48 0.05 <0.001 0.38 0.57
η 1.12 0.04 <0.001 1.04 1.2
φ 0.84 0.02 <0.001 0.8 0.88
ω 0.0000106 0.00001 0.46 -0.00002 0.00001
ρ 1 0.00003 <0.001 0.999 1
μ 0.1 0.005 <0.001 0.09 0.11
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Table 6: Implied Certainty Equivalents Using RDU-PAI Model
Calculations with average wealth
Large Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of Large Prize
Small Prize
(DKK)
Expected
Value (DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
200 0.5 100 150 141 0.937
500 0.5 100 300 244 0.813
1,000 0.5 100 550 395 0.717
2,000 0.5 100 1,050 668 0.636
5,000 0.5 100 2,550 1,418 0.556
5,000 0.01 100 149 126 0.848
5,000 0.1 100 590 290 0.492
5,000 0.3 100 1,570 751 0.478
5,000 0.7 100 3,530 2,371 0.672
5,000 0.9 100 4,510 3,800 0.842
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Table 7: PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 362 82 82
0.001 < ω # 0.05 33 7 89
0.05 < ω # 0.3 13 3 92
ω > 0.3 5 1 93
Missing 29 7 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 85 19 19
0 # r < 0.5 84 19 38
0.5 # r < 1 90 20 58
r $ 1 162 37 95
Missing 21 5 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 77 61 77 147 0 362
0.001 < ω # 0.05 8 9 5 11 0 33
0.05 < ω # 0.3 0 0 7 4 2 13
ω > 0.3 0 4 0 0 1 5
Missing 0 10 1 0 18 29
Total 85 84 90 162 21 442
Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 339 77 77
10 < ω × w # 1,000 25 6 83
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 34 8 90
ω × w > 100,000 15 3 93
Missing 29 7 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 76 50 73 140 0 339
10 < ω × w # 1,000 0 10 7 6 2 25
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 7 11 6 10 0 34
ω × w > 100,000 0 15 4 6 0 15
Missing 1 8 0 0 29 38
Total 85 84 90 162 31 442
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Appendix A: Experimental Lottery Parameters (ONLINE ONLY)
The variable “qid” is the label used to identify the specific lottery pair. The initial stem of the
qid defines the type of lottery, as explained in the text:
• The Loomes and Sugden [1998] lotteries are defined by the text “ls”;
• The Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994] lotteries are defined by the text “rWEW”; 
• The calibration premise lotteries, from the logic of Cox and Sadiraj [2008], are defined by the
text “wilcox”, since the earliest versions of these parameter values were based on Wilcox
[2013].
• The Wilcox [2015] lotteries are defined by the text “r” followed immediately by a number.
All prizes are defined in Danish kroner. Each subject was presented with all 60 binary choices,
presented in a random order that varied from subject to subject.
Batteries I, II and III are the same lotteries apart from a scaling of prizes, and were jointly
administered to 220 subjects. Battery IV was administered to the remaining 222 subjects.
Battery I: Low Scale
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |      qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls10       300       .5       900        0      1500       .5       300       .1       900       .8      1500       .1 |
  |     ls11       300       .5       900        0      1500       .5       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls12       300       .1       900       .8      1500       .1       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls13       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .5       900       .4      1500       .1 |
  |     ls14       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls15       300       .5       900       .4      1500       .1       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |     ls18       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300       .1       900      .75      1500      .15 |
  |     ls19       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |      ls2       300       .3       900        0      1500       .7       300      .15       900      .25      1500       .6 |
  |     ls20       300       .1       900      .75      1500      .15       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls21       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .6       900      .25      1500      .15 |
  |     ls22       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .5       900       .5      1500        0 |
  |     ls23       300       .6       900      .25      1500      .15       300       .5       900       .5      1500        0 |
  |     ls26       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300       .2       900       .6      1500       .2 |
  |     ls27       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300       .1       900       .9      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls28       300       .2       900       .6      1500       .2       300       .1       900       .9      1500        0 |
  |     ls29       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300       .5       900       .3      1500       .2 |
  |      ls3       300       .3       900        0      1500       .7       300        0       900       .5      1500       .5 |
  |     ls30       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |     ls31       300       .5       900       .3      1500       .2       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls34       300      .25       900        0      1500      .75       300       .1       900       .6      1500       .3 |
  |     ls35       300      .25       900        0      1500      .75       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls36       300       .1       900       .6      1500       .3       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls37       300       .5       900       .2      1500       .3       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |     ls38       300      .55       900        0      1500      .45       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls39       300      .55       900        0      1500      .45       300       .5       900       .2      1500       .3 |
  |      ls4       300      .15       900      .25      1500       .6       300        0       900       .5      1500       .5 |
  |      ls5       300      .15       900      .75      1500       .1       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |      ls6       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |      ls7       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300      .15       900      .75      1500       .1 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW1        90      .55      1080      .25      1260       .2        90      .55       810      .25      1620       .2 |
  |   rWEW10       450       .4       540       .4      1080       .2       270       .4       540       .4      1350       .2 |
  |   rWEW11       450       .4       990       .4      1080       .2       270       .4       990       .4      1350       .2 |
  |   rWEW12       450       .4      1080       .2      1440       .4       270       .4      1350       .2      1440       .4 |
  |   rWEW13       450       .7       990       .1      1890       .2       450       .7       630       .1      2250       .2 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW14       990       .1      1080       .7      1890       .2       630       .1      1080       .7      2250       .2 |
  |   rWEW15       990       .1      1710       .7      1890       .2       630       .1      1710       .7      2250       .2 |
  |   rWEW16       990       .1      1890       .2      2340       .7       630       .1      2250       .2      2340       .7 |
-A1-
  |   rWEW17         0       .5       360       .1       360       .4         0       .5         0       .1       540       .4 |
  |   rWEW18       360       .5       360       .1       360       .4         0       .1       360       .5       540       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW19       360       .1       360       .4       720       .5         0       .1       540       .4       720       .5 |
  |    rWEW2       630      .55      1080      .25      1260       .2       630      .55       810      .25      1620       .2 |
  |   rWEW20       360       .1       360       .4      1080       .5         0       .1       540       .4      1080       .5 |
  |   rWEW21       360       .5       720       .1       720       .4       360       .5       360       .1       900       .4 |
  |   rWEW22       720       .5       720       .1       720       .4       360       .1       720       .5       900       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW23       720       .1       720       .4      1080       .5       360       .1       900       .4      1080       .5 |
  |   rWEW24       720       .1       720       .4      1440       .5       360       .1       900       .4      1440       .5 |
  |    rWEW3      1080      .25      1170      .55      1260       .2       810      .25      1170      .55      1620       .2 |
  |    rWEW4      1080      .25      1260       .2      1710      .55       810      .25      1620       .2      1710      .55 |
  |    rWEW5        90      .65       630       .2       990      .15        90      .65       540       .2      1080      .15 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW6       450      .65       630       .2       990      .15       450      .65       540       .2      1080      .15 |
  |    rWEW7       630       .2       990      .15       810      .65       540       .2       810      .65      1080      .15 |
  |    rWEW8       630       .2       990      .15      1170      .65       540       .2      1080      .15      1170      .65 |
  |    rWEW9        90       .4       450       .4      1080       .2        90       .4       270       .4      1350       .2 |
  | wilcox12         0        0         0        0       800        1         0        0       650       .5       960       .5 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | wilcox14         0        0         0        0       850        1         0        0       770       .5       940       .5 |
  |  wilcox2         0        0         0        0       300        1         0        0       150       .5       460       .5 |
  | wilcox22         0        0         0        0      1300        1         0        0      1150       .5      1460       .5 |
  | wilcox24         0        0         0        0      1350        1         0        0      1270       .5      1440       .5 |
  |  wilcox4         0        0         0        0       150        1         0        0        70       .5       240       .5 |
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Battery II: Middle Scale
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |      qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls10       450       .5      1350        0      2250       .5       450       .1      1350       .8      2250       .1 |
  |     ls11       450       .5      1350        0      2250       .5       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls12       450       .1      1350       .8      2250       .1       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls13       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .5      1350       .4      2250       .1 |
  |     ls14       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls15       450       .5      1350       .4      2250       .1       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |     ls18       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450       .1      1350      .75      2250      .15 |
  |     ls19       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |      ls2       450       .3      1350        0      2250       .7       450      .15      1350      .25      2250       .6 |
  |     ls20       450       .1      1350      .75      2250      .15       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls21       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .6      1350      .25      2250      .15 |
  |     ls22       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .5      1350       .5      2250        0 |
  |     ls23       450       .6      1350      .25      2250      .15       450       .5      1350       .5      2250        0 |
  |     ls26       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450       .2      1350       .6      2250       .2 |
  |     ls27       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450       .1      1350       .9      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls28       450       .2      1350       .6      2250       .2       450       .1      1350       .9      2250        0 |
  |     ls29       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450       .5      1350       .3      2250       .2 |
  |      ls3       450       .3      1350        0      2250       .7       450        0      1350       .5      2250       .5 |
  |     ls30       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |     ls31       450       .5      1350       .3      2250       .2       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls34       450      .25      1350        0      2250      .75       450       .1      1350       .6      2250       .3 |
  |     ls35       450      .25      1350        0      2250      .75       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls36       450       .1      1350       .6      2250       .3       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls37       450       .5      1350       .2      2250       .3       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |     ls38       450      .55      1350        0      2250      .45       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls39       450      .55      1350        0      2250      .45       450       .5      1350       .2      2250       .3 |
  |      ls4       450      .15      1350      .25      2250       .6       450        0      1350       .5      2250       .5 |
  |      ls5       450      .15      1350      .75      2250       .1       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |      ls6       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |      ls7       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450      .15      1350      .75      2250       .1 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW1       135      .55      1620      .25      1890       .2       135      .55      1215      .25      2430       .2 |
  |   rWEW10       675       .4       810       .4      1620       .2       405       .4       810       .4      2025       .2 |
  |   rWEW11       675       .4      1485       .4      1620       .2       405       .4      1485       .4      2025       .2 |
  |   rWEW12       675       .4      1620       .2      2160       .4       405       .4      2025       .2      2160       .4 |
  |   rWEW13       675       .7      1485       .1      2835       .2       675       .7       945       .1      3375       .2 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW14      1485       .1      1620       .7      2835       .2       945       .1      1620       .7      3375       .2 |
  |   rWEW15      1485       .1      2565       .7      2835       .2       945       .1      2565       .7      3375       .2 |
  |   rWEW16      1485       .1      2835       .2      3510       .7       945       .1      3375       .2      3510       .7 |
  |   rWEW17         0       .5       540       .1       540       .4         0       .5         0       .1       810       .4 |
  |   rWEW18       540       .5       540       .1       540       .4         0       .1       540       .5       810       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW19       540       .1       540       .4      1080       .5         0       .1       810       .4      1080       .5 |
  |    rWEW2       945      .55      1620      .25      1890       .2       945      .55      1215      .25      2430       .2 |
  |   rWEW20       540       .1       540       .4      1620       .5         0       .1       810       .4      1620       .5 |
-A2-
  |   rWEW21       540       .5      1080       .1      1080       .4       540       .5       540       .1      1350       .4 |
  |   rWEW22      1080       .5      1080       .1      1080       .4       540       .1      1080       .5      1350       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW23      1080       .1      1080       .4      1620       .5       540       .1      1350       .4      1620       .5 |
  |   rWEW24      1080       .1      1080       .4      2160       .5       540       .1      1350       .4      2160       .5 |
  |    rWEW3      1620      .25      1755      .55      1890       .2      1215      .25      1755      .55      2430       .2 |
  |    rWEW4      1620      .25      1890       .2      2565      .55      1215      .25      2430       .2      2565      .55 |
  |    rWEW5       135      .65       945       .2      1485      .15       135      .65       810       .2      1620      .15 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW6       675      .65       945       .2      1485      .15       675      .65       810       .2      1620      .15 |
  |    rWEW7       945       .2      1485      .15      1215      .65       810       .2      1215      .65      1620      .15 |
  |    rWEW8       945       .2      1485      .15      1755      .65       810       .2      1620      .15      1755      .65 |
  |    rWEW9       135       .4       675       .4      1620       .2       135       .4       405       .4      2025       .2 |
  | wilcox12         0        0         0        0      1200        1         0        0       975       .5      1440       .5 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | wilcox14         0        0         0        0      1275        1         0        0      1155       .5      1410       .5 |
  |  wilcox2         0        0         0        0       450        1         0        0       225       .5       690       .5 |
  | wilcox22         0        0         0        0      1950        1         0        0      1725       .5      2190       .5 |
  | wilcox24         0        0         0        0      2025        1         0        0      1905       .5      2160       .5 |
  |  wilcox4         0        0         0        0       225        1         0        0       105       .5       360       .5 |
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Battery III: High Scale
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |      qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls10       600       .5      1800        0      3000       .5       600       .1      1800       .8      3000       .1 |
  |     ls11       600       .5      1800        0      3000       .5       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls12       600       .1      1800       .8      3000       .1       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls13       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .5      1800       .4      3000       .1 |
  |     ls14       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls15       600       .5      1800       .4      3000       .1       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |     ls18       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600       .1      1800      .75      3000      .15 |
  |     ls19       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |      ls2       600       .3      1800        0      3000       .7       600      .15      1800      .25      3000       .6 |
  |     ls20       600       .1      1800      .75      3000      .15       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls21       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .6      1800      .25      3000      .15 |
  |     ls22       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .5      1800       .5      3000        0 |
  |     ls23       600       .6      1800      .25      3000      .15       600       .5      1800       .5      3000        0 |
  |     ls26       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600       .2      1800       .6      3000       .2 |
  |     ls27       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600       .1      1800       .9      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls28       600       .2      1800       .6      3000       .2       600       .1      1800       .9      3000        0 |
  |     ls29       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600       .5      1800       .3      3000       .2 |
  |      ls3       600       .3      1800        0      3000       .7       600        0      1800       .5      3000       .5 |
  |     ls30       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |     ls31       600       .5      1800       .3      3000       .2       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls34       600      .25      1800        0      3000      .75       600       .1      1800       .6      3000       .3 |
  |     ls35       600      .25      1800        0      3000      .75       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls36       600       .1      1800       .6      3000       .3       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls37       600       .5      1800       .2      3000       .3       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |     ls38       600      .55      1800        0      3000      .45       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls39       600      .55      1800        0      3000      .45       600       .5      1800       .2      3000       .3 |
  |      ls4       600      .15      1800      .25      3000       .6       600        0      1800       .5      3000       .5 |
  |      ls5       600      .15      1800      .75      3000       .1       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |      ls6       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |      ls7       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600      .15      1800      .75      3000       .1 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW1       180      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2       180      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  |   rWEW10       900       .4      1080       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1080       .4      2700       .2 |
  |   rWEW11       900       .4      1980       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1980       .4      2700       .2 |
  |   rWEW12       900       .4      2160       .2      2880       .4       540       .4      2700       .2      2880       .4 |
  |   rWEW13       900       .7      1980       .1      3780       .2       900       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW14      1980       .1      2160       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      2160       .7      4500       .2 |
  |   rWEW15      1980       .1      3420       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      3420       .7      4500       .2 |
  |   rWEW16      1980       .1      3780       .2      4680       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2      4680       .7 |
  |   rWEW17         0       .5       720       .1       720       .4         0       .5         0       .1      1080       .4 |
  |   rWEW18       720       .5       720       .1       720       .4         0       .1       720       .5      1080       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW19       720       .1       720       .4      1440       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      1440       .5 |
  |    rWEW2      1260      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2      1260      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  |   rWEW20       720       .1       720       .4      2160       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      2160       .5 |
  |   rWEW21       720       .5      1440       .1      1440       .4       720       .5       720       .1      1800       .4 |
  |   rWEW22      1440       .5      1440       .1      1440       .4       720       .1      1440       .5      1800       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW23      1440       .1      1440       .4      2160       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2160       .5 |
  |   rWEW24      1440       .1      1440       .4      2880       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2880       .5 |
  |    rWEW3      2160      .25      2340      .55      2520       .2      1620      .25      2340      .55      3240       .2 |
  |    rWEW4      2160      .25      2520       .2      3420      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2      3420      .55 |
  |    rWEW5       180      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       180      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
-A3-
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW6       900      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       900      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
  |    rWEW7      1260       .2      1980      .15      1620      .65      1080       .2      1620      .65      2160      .15 |
  |    rWEW8      1260       .2      1980      .15      2340      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15      2340      .65 |
  |    rWEW9       180       .4       900       .4      2160       .2       180       .4       540       .4      2700       .2 |
  | wilcox12         0        0         0        0      1600        1         0        0      1300       .5      1920       .5 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | wilcox14         0        0         0        0      1700        1         0        0      1540       .5      1880       .5 |
  |  wilcox2         0        0         0        0       600        1         0        0       300       .5       920       .5 |
  | wilcox22         0        0         0        0      2600        1         0        0      2300       .5      2920       .5 |
  | wilcox24         0        0         0        0      2700        1         0        0      2540       .5      2880       .5 |
  |  wilcox4         0        0         0        0       300        1         0        0       140       .5       480       .5 |
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Battery IV
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |    qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r11       300        0       600        1      2100        0       300       .5       600        0      2100       .5 |
  |    r12       300        0       600      .75      2100      .25       300      .25       600        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r13       300      .25       600      .75      2100        0       300      .75       600        0      2100      .25 |
  |    r14       300        0       600       .5      2100       .5       300      .25       600        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r15       300        0       600      .75      2100      .25       300       .5       600        0      2100       .5 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r16       300        0       600        1      2100        0       300      .75       600        0      2100      .25 |
  |    r17       300      .25       600      .75      4200        0       300       .5       600        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r18       300        0       600        1      4200        0       300       .5       600        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r19       300       .5       600       .5      4200        0       300      .75       600        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r20       300        0       600        1      4200        0       300      .75       600        0      4200      .25 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r21       300        0      1200        1      2100        0       300      .25      1200        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r26       300        0      1200      .75      2100      .25       300       .5      1200        0      2100       .5 |
  |    r28       300      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       300       .5      1200        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r29       300        0      1200      .75      4200      .25       300      .25      1200        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r30       300       .5      1200       .5      4200        0       300      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r31       300      .25      1200       .5      4200      .25       300       .5      1200        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r32       300      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       300      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r33       300        0      1200       .5      4200       .5       300      .25      1200        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r34       300        0      2100        1      4200        0       300      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r35       300      .25      2100      .75      4200        0       300       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r39       300        0      2100      .75      4200      .25       300       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r40       300      .25      2100      .75      4200        0       300      .75      2100        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r41       300        0      2100        1      4200        0       300      .75      2100        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r42       600        0      1200        1      2100        0       600      .25      1200        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r43       600      .25      1200      .75      2100        0       600       .5      1200        0      2100       .5 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r44       600        0      1200        1      2100        0       600      .25      1200      .25      2100       .5 |
  |    r50       600        0      1200        1      2100        0       600      .75      1200        0      2100      .25 |
  |    r51       600      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       600       .5      1200        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r52       600       .5      1200       .5      4200        0       600      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r53       600      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       600      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r54       600        0      2100        1      4200        0       600      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r55       600      .25      2100      .75      4200        0       600       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r58      1200        0      2100        1      4200        0      1200      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r59      1200      .25      2100      .75      4200        0      1200       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r60      1200        0      2100      .75      4200      .25      1200      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r61      1200        0      2100        1      4200        0      1200       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |  rWEW1       180      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2       180      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  | rWEW10       900       .4      1080       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1080       .4      2700       .2 |
  | rWEW11       900       .4      1980       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1980       .4      2700       .2 |
  | rWEW12       900       .4      2160       .2      2880       .4       540       .4      2700       .2      2880       .4 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | rWEW13       900       .7      1980       .1      3780       .2       900       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2 |
  | rWEW14      1980       .1      2160       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      2160       .7      4500       .2 |
  | rWEW15      1980       .1      3420       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      3420       .7      4500       .2 |
  | rWEW16      1980       .1      3780       .2      4680       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2      4680       .7 |
  | rWEW17         0       .5       720       .5         0        0         0       .6         0        0      1080       .4 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | rWEW18         0        0       720        1         0        0         0       .1       720       .5      1080       .4 |
  | rWEW19       720       .5         0        0      1440       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      1440       .5 |
  |  rWEW2      1260      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2      1260      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  | rWEW20       720       .5         0        0      2160       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      2160       .5 |
  | rWEW21       720       .5      1440       .5         0        0       720       .6         0        0      1800       .4 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | rWEW22      1440        1         0        0         0        0       720       .1      1440       .5      1800       .4 |
  | rWEW23      1440       .5         0        0      2160       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2160       .5 |
  | rWEW24      1440       .5         0        0      2880       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2880       .5 |
  |  rWEW3      2160      .25      2340      .55      2520       .2      1620      .25      2340      .55      3240       .2 |
  |  rWEW4      2160      .25      2520       .2      3420      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2      3420      .55 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |  rWEW5       180      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       180      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
-A4-
  |  rWEW6       900      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       900      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
  |  rWEW7      1260       .2      1980      .15      1620      .65      1080       .2      1620      .65      2160      .15 |
  |  rWEW8      1260       .2      1980      .15      2340      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15      2340      .65 |
  |  rWEW9       180       .4       900       .4      2160       .2       180       .4       540       .4      2700       .2 |
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
In Battery I there are 37 distinct prizes, with positive probability, for each subject and 16 distinct
probabilities, distributed as follows:
      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          6        2.04        2.04
         70 |          1        0.34        2.38
         90 |          6        2.04        4.42
        150 |          2        0.68        5.10
        240 |          1        0.34        5.44
        270 |          4        1.36        6.80
        300 |         51       17.35       24.15
        360 |         16        5.44       29.59
        450 |          8        2.72       32.31
        460 |          1        0.34       32.65
        540 |         10        3.40       36.05
        630 |         10        3.40       39.46
        650 |          1        0.34       39.80
        720 |         12        4.08       43.88
        770 |          1        0.34       44.22
        800 |          1        0.34       44.56
        810 |          6        2.04       46.60
        850 |          1        0.34       46.94
        900 |         44       14.97       61.90
        940 |          1        0.34       62.24
        960 |          1        0.34       62.59
        990 |         10        3.40       65.99
       1080 |         18        6.12       72.11
       1150 |          1        0.34       72.45
       1170 |          4        1.36       73.81
       1260 |          4        1.36       75.17
       1270 |          1        0.34       75.51
       1300 |          1        0.34       75.85
       1350 |          5        1.70       77.55
       1440 |          5        1.70       79.25
       1460 |          1        0.34       79.59
       1500 |         42       14.29       93.88
       1620 |          4        1.36       95.24
       1710 |          4        1.36       96.60
       1890 |          4        1.36       97.96
       2250 |          4        1.36       99.32
       2340 |          2        0.68      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
       prob |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
         .1 |         38       12.93       12.93
        .15 |         16        5.44       18.37
         .2 |         40       13.61       31.97
        .25 |         14        4.76       36.73
         .3 |         12        4.08       40.82
         .4 |         48       16.33       57.14
        .45 |          2        0.68       57.82
         .5 |         46       15.65       73.47
        .55 |         10        3.40       76.87
         .6 |         22        7.48       84.35
        .65 |          8        2.72       87.07
         .7 |         14        4.76       91.84
        .75 |          6        2.04       93.88
         .8 |          2        0.68       94.56
         .9 |          2        0.68       95.24
          1 |         14        4.76      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
The same pattern applies to Battery II and Battery III, where the prize levels are multiplied by 1.5 and
2, respectively. The probability batteries are therefore identical to Battery I, above. In Battery II there
is this distribution of (37) distinct prizes:
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      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          6        2.04        2.04
        105 |          1        0.34        2.38
        135 |          6        2.04        4.42
        225 |          2        0.68        5.10
        360 |          1        0.34        5.44
        405 |          4        1.36        6.80
        450 |         51       17.35       24.15
        540 |         16        5.44       29.59
        675 |          8        2.72       32.31
        690 |          1        0.34       32.65
        810 |         10        3.40       36.05
        945 |         10        3.40       39.46
        975 |          1        0.34       39.80
       1080 |         12        4.08       43.88
       1155 |          1        0.34       44.22
       1200 |          1        0.34       44.56
       1215 |          6        2.04       46.60
       1275 |          1        0.34       46.94
       1350 |         44       14.97       61.90
       1410 |          1        0.34       62.24
       1440 |          1        0.34       62.59
       1485 |         10        3.40       65.99
       1620 |         18        6.12       72.11
       1725 |          1        0.34       72.45
       1755 |          4        1.36       73.81
       1890 |          4        1.36       75.17
       1905 |          1        0.34       75.51
       1950 |          1        0.34       75.85
       2025 |          5        1.70       77.55
       2160 |          5        1.70       79.25
       2190 |          1        0.34       79.59
       2250 |         42       14.29       93.88
       2430 |          4        1.36       95.24
       2565 |          4        1.36       96.60
       2835 |          4        1.36       97.96
       3375 |          4        1.36       99.32
       3510 |          2        0.68      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
In Battery III there are these tabulations of prizes:
     prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          6        2.04        2.04
        140 |          1        0.34        2.38
        180 |          6        2.04        4.42
        300 |          2        0.68        5.10
        480 |          1        0.34        5.44
        540 |          4        1.36        6.80
        600 |         51       17.35       24.15
        720 |         16        5.44       29.59
        900 |          8        2.72       32.31
        920 |          1        0.34       32.65
       1080 |         10        3.40       36.05
       1260 |         10        3.40       39.46
       1300 |          1        0.34       39.80
       1440 |         12        4.08       43.88
       1540 |          1        0.34       44.22
       1600 |          1        0.34       44.56
       1620 |          6        2.04       46.60
       1700 |          1        0.34       46.94
       1800 |         44       14.97       61.90
       1880 |          1        0.34       62.24
       1920 |          1        0.34       62.59
       1980 |         10        3.40       65.99
       2160 |         18        6.12       72.11
       2300 |          1        0.34       72.45
       2340 |          4        1.36       73.81
       2520 |          4        1.36       75.17
       2540 |          1        0.34       75.51
       2600 |          1        0.34       75.85
       2700 |          5        1.70       77.55
       2880 |          5        1.70       79.25
       2920 |          1        0.34       79.59
       3000 |         42       14.29       93.88
       3240 |          4        1.36       95.24
       3420 |          4        1.36       96.60
       3780 |          4        1.36       97.96
       4500 |          4        1.36       99.32
       4680 |          2        0.68      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
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In Battery IV there are 26 distinct prizes, and 12 distinct probabilities:
      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          5        1.89        1.89
        180 |          6        2.26        4.15
        300 |         32       12.08       16.23
        540 |          4        1.51       17.74
        600 |         24        9.06       26.79
        720 |         10        3.77       30.57
        900 |          8        3.02       33.58
       1080 |         10        3.77       37.36
       1200 |         21        7.92       45.28
       1260 |         10        3.77       49.06
       1440 |          7        2.64       51.70
       1620 |          6        2.26       53.96
       1800 |          4        1.51       55.47
       1980 |         10        3.77       59.25
       2100 |         27       10.19       69.43
       2160 |         18        6.79       76.23
       2340 |          4        1.51       77.74
       2520 |          4        1.51       79.25
       2700 |          4        1.51       80.75
       2880 |          4        1.51       82.26
       3240 |          4        1.51       83.77
       3420 |          4        1.51       85.28
       3780 |          4        1.51       86.79
       4200 |         29       10.94       97.74
       4500 |          4        1.51       99.25
       4680 |          2        0.75      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        265      100.00
       prob |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
         .1 |         14        5.28        5.28
        .15 |          8        3.02        8.30
         .2 |         32       12.08       20.38
        .25 |         50       18.87       39.25
         .4 |         24        9.06       48.30
         .5 |         58       21.89       70.19
        .55 |          8        3.02       73.21
         .6 |          2        0.75       73.96
        .65 |          8        3.02       76.98
         .7 |          8        3.02       80.00
        .75 |         38       14.34       94.34
          1 |         15        5.66      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        265      100.00
For the pooled analyses over all subjects, there are 90 distinct prizes and 16 distinct
probabilities:
      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |         41        2.02        2.02
         70 |          2        0.10        2.12
         90 |         12        0.59        2.71
        105 |          2        0.10        2.81
        135 |         12        0.59        3.40
        140 |          2        0.10        3.50
        150 |          4        0.20        3.70
        180 |         18        0.89        4.58
        225 |          4        0.20        4.78
        240 |          2        0.10        4.88
        270 |          8        0.39        5.27
        300 |        138        6.80       12.07
        360 |         34        1.68       13.75
        405 |          8        0.39       14.14
        450 |        118        5.82       19.96
        460 |          2        0.10       20.06
        480 |          2        0.10       20.16
        540 |         64        3.15       23.31
        600 |        126        6.21       29.52
        630 |         20        0.99       30.51
        650 |          2        0.10       30.61
        675 |         16        0.79       31.39
        690 |          2        0.10       31.49
        720 |         66        3.25       34.75
        770 |          2        0.10       34.84
        800 |          2        0.10       34.94
        810 |         32        1.58       36.52
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        850 |          2        0.10       36.62
        900 |        112        5.52       42.14
        920 |          2        0.10       42.24
        940 |          2        0.10       42.34
        945 |         20        0.99       43.32
        960 |          2        0.10       43.42
        975 |          2        0.10       43.52
        990 |         20        0.99       44.50
       1080 |         90        4.44       48.94
       1150 |          2        0.10       49.04
       1155 |          2        0.10       49.14
       1170 |          8        0.39       49.53
       1200 |         23        1.13       50.67
       1215 |         12        0.59       51.26
       1260 |         38        1.87       53.13
       1270 |          2        0.10       53.23
       1275 |          2        0.10       53.33
       1300 |          4        0.20       53.52
       1350 |         98        4.83       58.35
       1410 |          2        0.10       58.45
       1440 |         43        2.12       60.57
       1460 |          2        0.10       60.67
       1485 |         20        0.99       61.66
       1500 |         84        4.14       65.80
       1540 |          2        0.10       65.89
       1600 |          2        0.10       65.99
       1620 |         62        3.06       69.05
       1700 |          2        0.10       69.15
       1710 |          8        0.39       69.54
       1725 |          2        0.10       69.64
       1755 |          8        0.39       70.03
       1800 |         92        4.53       74.57
       1880 |          2        0.10       74.67
       1890 |         16        0.79       75.46
       1905 |          2        0.10       75.55
       1920 |          2        0.10       75.65
       1950 |          2        0.10       75.75
       1980 |         30        1.48       77.23
       2025 |         10        0.49       77.72
       2100 |         27        1.33       79.05
       2160 |         64        3.15       82.21
       2190 |          2        0.10       82.31
       2250 |         92        4.53       86.84
       2300 |          2        0.10       86.94
       2340 |         16        0.79       87.73
       2430 |          8        0.39       88.12
       2520 |         12        0.59       88.71
       2540 |          2        0.10       88.81
       2565 |          8        0.39       89.21
       2600 |          2        0.10       89.31
       2700 |         14        0.69       90.00
       2835 |          8        0.39       90.39
       2880 |         14        0.69       91.08
       2920 |          2        0.10       91.18
       3000 |         84        4.14       95.32
       3240 |         12        0.59       95.91
       3375 |          8        0.39       96.30
       3420 |         12        0.59       96.90
       3510 |          4        0.20       97.09
       3780 |         12        0.59       97.68
       4200 |         29        1.43       99.11
       4500 |         12        0.59       99.70
       4680 |          6        0.30      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |      2,029      100.00
       prob |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
         .1 |        242       11.93       11.93
        .15 |        104        5.13       17.05
         .2 |        272       13.41       30.46
        .25 |        134        6.60       37.06
         .3 |         72        3.55       40.61
         .4 |        312       15.38       55.99
        .45 |         12        0.59       56.58
         .5 |        334       16.46       73.04
        .55 |         68        3.35       76.39
         .6 |        134        6.60       83.00
        .65 |         56        2.76       85.76
         .7 |         92        4.53       90.29
        .75 |         74        3.65       93.94
         .8 |         12        0.59       94.53
         .9 |         12        0.59       95.12
          1 |         99        4.88      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |      2,029      100.00
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Figure A1 displays the raw choices against the difference in EV, and Figure A2 repeats that
display differentiated by quartiles of Net Wealth. The pattern of choices does not differ with Net
Wealth, at least at this level of description.
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Appendix B: Additional Results
Unconditional Tests of NAI
If we assume that every individual is characterized by EUT-PAI, we find that 220 out of 330 valid
estimates, or 67%, have p-values on the test of the hypothesis ω = 0 that are below 5%. Hence we conclude that
67% of the sample deviate from NAI. Of course, recall from the text that only 30% of the sample (or 32% of the
solved cases) were deemed consistent with EUT at the 5% level.
If we assume that every individual is characterized by RDU-PAI, we find that 264 out of 338 valid
estimates, or 78%, have p-values on the test of the hypothesis ω = 0 that are below 5%. Hence we conclude that
78% of the sample deviate from NAI. As noted, we find that 70% of the sample (or 68% of the solved cases)
were deemed consistent with RDU at the 5% level.
Unconditional Estimates of Parameters
Table B1 shows tabulations of estimates assuming that every subject is characterized by an EUT-PAI
specification, although the estimates are specific to that individual. Table B2 does likewise, assuming that every
subject is characterized by a RDU-PAI specification, again where the estimates are specific to that individual.
We report estimates in intervals, because the confidentiality of access to individual data within Statistics
Denmark does not allow us to report estimates for any one individual. Nonetheless, these tabulations provide a
rich characterization.
Panel A within each table show the range of estimates of ω. We find that 71% of the subjects have an
estimate of ω that is less than 0.05 under the EUT-PAI specification, and 62% under the RDU-PAI
specification. Again, these are the same subjects, just with different specifications assumed: the main text
presents comparable results when we condition on whether an individual is better characterized as EUT or
RDU. However, even these unconditional estimates confirm the tendency clear from the pooled estimates, that
many individuals are approximating NAI. Of course, we need to match these ω estimates with the Net Wealth w
that each subject has, and we do that below.
Panel B within each table shows the range of estimates of r. Under EUT, we find 36.9% (= 11.3 + 25.6)
with estimates signifying modest risk aversion: 0 < r < 1. On the other hand, 34% have estimates of r that
exceed 1, and some of those estimates could be quite large. We have not in these tabulations conditioned on the
statistical significance of these estimates; that is done in the main text. Under RDU the comparable fractions are
26.9% and 30.5%, respectively. Of course, under RDU the coefficient r is only a part of the characterization of
risk attitudes, and one has to attend to the effects of probability weighting as well.
Panel C within each table shows a cross-tabulation of these estimates of ω and r. We immediately
observe that 129 (= 107 + 22) of the 150 estimates of r > 1 under EUT are for individuals with extremely low ω
estimates below 0.05. For RDU we find that 108 (= 35 + 73) of the 135 estimates of r > 1 are for individuals
with ω below 0.05.
Panel D is an important complement to Panel A, since it multiplies the estimate of ω for the individual
by the Net Wealth w of the same individual, telling us in effect what “weighted baseline wealth” the individual
aggregates with experimental income. Under EUT we have 25% of the subjects with weighted baseline wealth
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less than 10 kroner, which is effectively zero. But we have 27% with weighted baseline wealth between 10 and
1,000 kroner, 21% between 1,000 and 100,000 kroner, and 14% over 100,000 kroner. So this is an important
pattern of heterogeneity, illustrating why it is important to look at the interaction of the ω parameter with
individual wealth w. Under RDU we get even higher weighted baseline wealth levels: only 8% below 10 kroner,
only 14% between 10 and 1,000 kroner, but 40% between 10,000 and 100,000 kroner, and 17% over 100,000
kroner.
Panel E provides a cross-tabulation of these estimates of ω×w and r, akin to Panel C.
Estimates of Parameters Conditional on Model of Risk Preferences
Table B3 shows tabulations of individual estimates in which we condition on the descriptively best
model of risk preferences for each subject. As noted in the main text, we find that 68% of the sample are better
characterized as RDU decision-makers than EUT decision-makers. The formal test here is that π(p)=p, which is
the case when η = φ = 1 from the probability weighting function (12). In Table B3 the estimates of ω and r for
each individual are taken from the estimates for that individual conditional on the preferred model (EUT or
RDU) for that individual. Hence they tend to look more like the tabulations in Table B2 than the tabulations in
Table B1.
The tabulations in Table B3 are provided to allow one to see the effect of conditioning solely on the
model of risk preferences, in contrast to Table 7 which conditions on the model or risk preferences and the
statistical significance of parameter estimates.
Alternative Calculations of Certainty Equivalents
In the text the definition of a Certainty Equivalent (CE) when one allows for partial asset integration is
provided by (14). An alternative definition is formally possible, and although we do not believe it to be a
“natural definition” in terms of the economic implications, we demonstrate here that it does not change our
general conclusions if we use it.
Let H denote a high prize and L denote a low prize, for H>L. The CE in Table B4 is then the sure
amount of money that has the same expected utility to the individual as the lottery that pays H with probability
p and L with probability (1-p). In Panel A of Table B4, and in Table 4 of the main text, the CE solves
U(w, CE) = p × U(w, H) + (1-p) × U(w, L). (14)
So this CE solves for risky income in the experiment, and the stakes are chosen to be within the payoff domain
in our experiments. In Panel B of Table B4 the CE solves for risky wealth, holding constant the experimental
income at zero, and the stakes are chosen to span “life-changing” changes in wealth for most Danes. Formally,
for Panel B the CE solves
U(w+CE, 0) = p × U(w+H, 0) + (1-p) × U(w+L, 0). (14N)
We believe this definition of the CE to be less interesting, since it amounts to us saying to the subjects, as they
come in to the session: “We can give you a certain amount of money, CE, to add to the wealth w that you have
outside of the lab, and agree not to participate in the experiment and hence get $0 payoffs from the experiment
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with certainty.” The definition of CE in (14), on the other hand, implies a much more natural economic
scenario.
Another issue with this CE calculation, raised by a referee, may be stated as follows: if one posed the CE
thought experiment in question to the subject, would we change the way they evaluate lab income and wealth?
Could there be something contextual in behavioral responses to that sort of task, rather than the one we posed
(pick between to lotteries over lab income)? This is a reasonable concern, and although the formal mathematics
of the calculation defined by (14N) allow us to compute CE, it requires us to assume that there is no context-
effect from posing these sorts of questions with respect to changes in wealth. This assumption is not obvious a
priori, and at the very least can and should be tested behaviorally.
The smallest ratio of CE to EV in Table B4 is 0.362, and most are much higher: these ratios are hardly
implausible in the sense of the term used by Hansson [1988], Rabin [2000], Neilson [2001], Rieger and Wang
[2006], Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Safra and Segal [2008].
The same point applies for our evaluation of the CE in the RDU case. Using the same lotteries as in
Table 4 and Table B4, in Panel A of Table B5 the CE now solves
U(w, CE) = h(p) × U(w, H) + (1-h(p)) × U(w, L), (15)
and in Panel B of Table B5 the CE solves
U(w+CE, 0) = h(p) × U(w+H, 0) + (1-h(p)) × U(w+L, 0). (15N)
The smallest ratio of CE to EV in Table B5 is 0.478, and most are much higher, exactly as in Table B4. In fact,
in one case the CE exceeds the EV, but this is completely intuitive: the probability on the high prize of 400,000
kroner (.$60,214) is 0.010, and the low prize is only 100 kroner.44 In general the ratios in Tables B4 and B5 are
similar. 
The Distribution of Ratios of CE to EV for Individuals
Our evaluations of the payoff calibration implications of the aggregate estimates for the RDU-PAI model,
in Figure 6, provide a simple way to characterize the payoff calibration implications for the complete set of
individual estimates. For each subject we can repeat the simulations underlying Figure 6, but using the estimates
for that individual and the Net Wealth for that individual. EUT subjects are simply RDU subjects for whom η =
φ = 1, so can be included in the same simulations correctly. We can then summarize the ratio of CE to EV
across all subjects and simulated choices: there is an average of 0.83 and a median of 0.96. The complete
distribution of these ratios, shown in Figure B3, does reveal some low ratios, and some ratios indicating risk-loving
choices, reflecting the heterogeneity of risk preferences and lotteries evaluated. But the overall pattern confirms
our general finding of plausible patterns of risk aversion.
44 From the left panel of Figure 5 we can, just, see that the probability weighting is “optimistic” for
very small probabilities, so this probability of 0.010 becomes 0.0171, which is in turn the decision weight on
the top prize. Assuming a linear utility function for simplicity, the decision-weighted EV is then 0.0171 × 400,000
+ (1-0.0171) × 100 = 6,962, which is 1.698 times the EV of 4,099 kroner. The actual CE is slightly less, at
6,937 kroner, taking into account the fact that UO<0 for the RDU specification in Table 5.
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Table B1: EUT-PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 232 52.5 52.5
0.001 < ω # 0.05 82 18.6 71
0.05 < ω # 0.3 49 11.1 82.1
ω > 0.3 26 5.9 88
Missing 53 12 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 76 17.2 17.2
0 # r < 0.5 50 11.3 28.5
0.5 # r < 1 113 25.6 54.1
r $ 1 150 34 87.1
Missing 53 12 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 34 20 71 107 0 232
0.001 < ω # 0.05 33  16 11 22 0 82
0.05 < ω # 0.3 6 10 20 13 0 49
ω > 0.3 3 4 11 8 0 26
Missing 0 0 0 0 53 53
Total 76 50 113 150 53 442
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Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 110 24.9 34.9
10 < ω × w # 1,000 121 27.4 52.3
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 94 21.3 75.5
ω × w > 100,000 64 14.5 88
Missing 53 12 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 17 5 32 56 0 110
10 < ω × w # 1,000 17 17 44 43 0 121
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 32 17 14 31 0 94
ω × w > 100,000 10 11 23 20 0 64
Missing 0 0 0 0 53 53
Total 76 50 113 150 53 442
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Table B2: RDU-PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 95 21.5 21.5
0.001 < ω # 0.05 178 40.3 61.8
0.05 < ω # 0.3 30 6.8 68.6
ω > 0.3 50 11.3 79.9
Missing 89 20.1 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 99 22.4 22.4
0 # r < 0.5 38 8.6 31
0.5 # r < 1 81 18.3 49.3
r $ 1 135 30.5 79.9
Missing 89 20.1 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 19 8 33 35 0 95
0.001 < ω # 0.05 53 14 38 73 0 178
0.05 < ω # 0.3 9 6 5 10 0 30
ω > 0.3 18 10 5 17 0 50
Missing 0 0 0 0 89 89
Total 99 38 81 135 89 442
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Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 37 8.4 8.4
10 < ω × w # 1,000 63 14.2 22.6
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 178 40.3 62.9
ω × w > 100,000 75 17 79.9
Missing 89 20.1 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 9 4 18 6 0 37
10 < ω × w # 1,000 15 4 18 26 0 63
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 53 11 37 77 0 178
ω × w > 100,000 22 19 8 26 0 75
Missing 0 0 0 0 53 53
Total 99 38 81 135 53 442
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Table B3: PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 154 34.8 34.8
0.001 < ω # 0.05 168 38 72.8
0.05 < ω # 0.3 43 9.7 82.6
ω > 0.3 48 10.9 93.4
Missing 29 6.6 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 102 23.1 23.1
0 # r < 0.5 45 10.2 33.3
0.5 # r < 1 93 21 54.3
r $ 1 173 39.1 93.4
Missing 20 6.6 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 25 12 44 73 0 154
0.001 < ω # 0.05 57 14 31 66 0 168
0.05 < ω # 0.3 5 10 11 17 0 43
ω > 0.3 15 9 7 17 0 48
Missing 0 0 0 0 29 29
Total 102 45 93 173 29 442
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Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 77 17.4 17.4
10 < ω × w # 1,000 86 19.5 36.9
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 164 37.1 74
ω × w > 100,000 86 19.5 93.4
Missing 29 6.6 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 11 6 26 34 0 77
10 < ω × w # 1,000 18 7 25 36 0 86
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 51 12 30 71 0 164
ω × w > 100,000 22 20 12 32 0 86
Missing 0 0 0 0 29 29
Total 102 45 93 173 29 442
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Table B4: Implied Certainty Equivalents Using EUT-PAI Model
Calculations with average wealth
High Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of High Prize
Low Prize
(DKK)
Expected Value
(DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
A. Risky Lottery in Experiment
200 0.5 100 150 145 0.965
500 0.5 100 300 252 0.84
1000 0.5 100 550 402 0.73
2000 0.5 100 1,050 663 0.631
5000 0.5 100 2,550 1,350 0.529
5000 0.01 100 149 109 0.732
5000 0.1 100 590 214 0.362
5000 0.3 100 1,570 626 0.399
5000 0.7 100 3,530 2,459 0.697
5000 0.9 100 4,510 4,025 0.892
B. Risky Lottery in Wealth
200 0.5 100 150 150 0.999
1000 0.5 100 550 550 0.999
5000 0.5 100 2,550 2,549 0.999
100000 0.5 100 50,050 49,794 0.995
11000 0.5 10,000 10,500 10,500 0.999
50000 0.5 10,000 30,000 29,959 0.999
100000 0.5 10,000 55,000 54,792 0.996
400000 0.5 10,000 205,000 201,286 0.982
400000 0.01 100 4,099 3,945 0.962
400000 0.3 100 120,070 116,793 0.973
400000 0.5 100 200,050 196,139 0.98
400000 0.7 100 280,030 276,738 0.988
400000 0.9 100 360,010 358,596 0.996
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Table B5: Implied Certainty Equivalents Using RDU-PAI Model
Calculations with average wealth
Large Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of Large Prize
Small Prize
(DKK)
Expected Value
(DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
A. Risky Lottery in Experiment
200 0.5 $100 $150 141 0.937
500 0.5 $100 $300 244 0.813
1,000 0.5 $100 $550 395 0.717
2,000 0.5 $100 $1,050 668 0.636
5,000 0.5 $100 $2,550 1,418 0.556
5,000 0.01 $100 $149 126 0.848
5,000 0.1 $100 $590 290 0.492
5,000 0.3 $100 $1,570 751 0.478
5,000 0.7 $100 $3,530 2,371 0.672
5,000 0.9 $100 $4,510 3,800 0.842
B. Risky Lottery in Wealth
200 0.5 $100 $150 144 0.959
1,000 0.5 $100 $550 495 0.9
5,000 0.5 $100 $2,550 2,251 0.883
100,000 0.5 $100 $50,050 43,769 0.875
11,000 0.5 $10,000 $10,500 10,439 0.994
50,000 0.5 $10,000 $30,000 27.530 0.918
100,000 0.5 $10,000 $55,000 49,359 0.897
400,000 0.5 $10,000 $205,000 178,473 0.871
400,000 0.01 $100 $4,099 6,937 1.692
400,000 0.3 $100 $120,070 105,797 0.881
400,000 0.5 $100 $200,050 172,774 0.864
400,000 0.7 $100 $280,030 247,009 0.882
400,000 0.9 $100 $360,010 336,228 0.934
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